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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Reserving the argument that this Court may not have jurisdiction over this matter,
this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL BECAUSE
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS PREMATURELY FILED. The Standard of
Review concerning whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law.
State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991).

II.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES DID
NOT INTEND TO DISSOLVE THE ORDER FOR SEPARATE
MAINTENANCE AND THAT THEY HAD NOT EFFECTUATED A
COMPLETE AND VOLUNTARY RECONCILIATION AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 30-4-3(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. The Standard of Review is
that findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard
of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah
App. 1989).

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE ORDER OF
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE WAS AN ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENT. The
Standard of Review is thatfindingsof fact in divorce appeals are subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jense v.
Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989).

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT FACIO FAILED TO
PERFORM CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE POTENTIAL
RECONCILIATION. The Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce
appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such that due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989).

VI.

THE PROPERTY DIVISION CLAIMS ARE ESSENTIALLY MOOT BASED
1
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ON THE FACT THAT THEY WERE EXECUTED UNDER THE ORDER OF
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. The Standard of Review is that findings of fact in
divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such that
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (UtahApp.
1989).
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY EQUITABLY DIVIDED THE
MARITAL ESTATE. The Standard of Review is that trial courts have
considerable discretion in determining alimony and property distributions in
divorce cases, and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion
is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (UtahApp. 1988).

VIII. THE APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL. The standard is that in divorce cases, "Whether attorney fees are
recoverable in an action is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness."
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs.. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Generally, the prevailing party on appeal in divorce cases is entitled to an award of
attorney fees. Marhsall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes the Appellee believes are determinative in this appeal and
are attached hereto in the Addendum: 30-4-3 and 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
W.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. On August 11,1992, Burge filed a Complaint for an Order of Separate

Maintenance. R. 1-8 (hereinafter referred to as "the Order").
2. Facio executed an Acceptance of Service, Consent and Waiver. R. 9-10.
3. On August 29, 1992, the Court entered the Order. R. 12-24.
4. On October 7, 1997, Burge filed an Amended Complaint for Divorce. R. 27-37.

2
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5. On November 7, 1997, Facio filed a Pro Se answer. R. 45-47.
6. On December 24, 1998, Burge filed a Motion to Bifurcate the action. R. 192.
7. On December 29, 1998, Facio filed his consent to bifurcate. R. 213.
8. On March 19, 1999, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Bifurcated Decree of Divorce. R. 243-247.
9. The case goes to trial on May 30, 2000. R. 282.
10. On April 19, 2001, the Court enters its Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce. R. 307-340.
11. Facio files an Objection to the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on April 25, 2001. R. 343-345.
12. On May 18,2001, Facio filed his Notice of Appeal. R. 347-348.
13. On June 13, 2001, the Court entered its Second Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law and Amended Decree of Divorce. R. 350-384.
X.

FACTUAL HISTORY
1. Burge and Facio were married on March 16, 1974. R. 1.
2. The parties had two children, Ashley, born March 31, 1980 and a minor, Paul,

born April 20, 1987. R. 1.
3. The parties separated initially on May 16, 1991. R. 1
4. On August 11,1992, Burge filed a complaint for separate maintenance. R. 1-8.
5. The Court entered the Order on August 28, 1992. R. 12-24.

3
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6. Burge filed an Amended Complaint for Divorce on October 7, 1997. R. 27-37.
7. The case was tried in a one day trial before the Honorable Judge Bohling on
May 30, 2000, with only Burge and Facio as witnesses. See generally Trial Transcript, R.
387.
Burge Direct Examination
8. Since moving to Utah, Burge was continually employed. TT. P. 12-13.
9. Facio's employment history was changeable. TT.P. 13 L 5 to P. 16 L9.
10. The parties owned the Live Oak and the E Street homes. TT. P. 21, L. 6-19. "
11. The Live Oak residence was titled solely in Burge's name and the debt thereon
was solely in her name. TT. P. 22, L. 8-15.
12. The down payment of the Live Oak home came from Burge's separate assets.
TT.P.34,L. 12 to P. 35, L. 4.
13. After 1989, Facio contributed very little financially. TT. P. 24, L. 13-16.
14. Facio surreptititiously depleted family assets, including IRAs and his
daughter's college fund. TT. P. 25 L. 24 to P. 29, L. 15.
15. In 1991, Burge discovered that Facio had not filed the parties' taxes. Burge
filed separately and has had done so since. TT. P. 25, L. 1-10.
16. Burge did not complete the 1991 divorce because Facio asked her for a legal
separation thereby dividing up their assets and liabilities but maintaining the marriage.
TT.P.30,L. 1-14.

4
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17. Facio told Burge he was represented by Mr. Barnard. TT. P. 19 L. 8 - TT. P.
20 L. 10.
18. The parties agreed the Order completely divided their assets. TT. P. 44 L. 1517 Burge quit claimed the E Street house to Facio and it was sold.

Burge was given a

portion of the equity as restitution for the money Facio had taken dishonestly and other
expenses. Facio retained the rest. TT. P. 39 L. 1-24.
19. Burge was awarded the Live Oak home. TT. P. 37 L 9-11. Burge invested
her portion of the E Street home equity into her Live Oak home. TT. P. 56 L 15 - TT. P.
57 L.5.
20. Each party was awarded their own retirement account. TT.P. 40-L. 10-24.
21. Facio cashed out and spent his retirement. TT. P.41, L.2-17.
22. Burge paid the debts she was ordered to pay. TT. P. 45 L. 3-4.
23. Since 1991, Burge maintained separate banking accounts. TT. P. 46, L. 21 - P.
47. L. 7.
24. Burge identified a letter from Facio dated March 1993 wherein he promised to
do certain things and, if competed, they would get back together. These included paying
taxes, paying bills on time and remaining monogamous. TT. P. 89, L. 1 - TT. P. 90 L.
and the letter is in the record at R. 137 (hereinafter "the Letter.")
25. In the Letter, Facio made promises to change his conduct and requested the
parties agree to mutually attend counseling to address issues including "deciding on

5
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remarriage." R. 137.
26. Burge even responded to Facio in writing: "Lets do this but not as a married
couple. As the parents of two wonderfiil kids who need responsible parents - as people
who are kind to each other - but not involved with each other." R. 137.
27. After the entry of the Order, Facio moved back into the Live Oak house. This
conditional move back into the residence was based on Facio's agreement to, among
other things, pay his taxes, his bills on time and not date other people. TT. P. 49 L. 23 TTP50L. 13 andR. 137.

"

28. Burge believed the Letter meant that if Facio lived up to his promises and they
went to counseling they could be as husband and wife again, but said they "were never
able to get to that point." TT P 90 LI7-23.
29. Facio failed to perform the conditions. He had relationships with other
women, he did not pay his taxes and he did not pay his bills. TT. P. 50 L 14 - TT. P. 51 L.
23.
30. During the time Facio was back in the home, Facio repeatedly told Burge the
Order was there for her protection. TT. P. 45, L. 20-24.
31. The parties treated the order as though it was still in effect. TT. P. 46, L. 1921.
32. In 1994 Facio agreed to pay child support as ordered. TT. P. 53, L. 8-14.
33. Burge stated that she asked her company's personnel director if she
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could carry Facio on her insurance while legally separated. P. 97 L. 2- 19.
34. On June 28, 1996, Burge received a letter from Sears apologizing for listing
her name on Facio's Sears account, which was removed when Facio informed Sears that
they were legally separated. TT. P. 96, L. 4-18.
35. Burge testified concerning Exhibit No 36 which was Facio's Consumer Credit
Counseling application wherein he did not list Burge as his wife, did not list any
household or joint obligation, and enlisted Consumer Credit Counseling's assistance
solely for his own personal debts and obligations. TT. P. 99, L. 1-25.
36. All improvements to the Live Oak property were paid by Burge. TT. P. 56 L.
15-TT.P. 57L8.
37. Burge paid all the household expenses and expenses for the children. TT. P.
22, L. 16-21
38. From 1994 to 1997, Facio contributed only $5,600 to the family. TT.
P. 23, L. 9-15.
39. Facio did not pay the debts nor the child support as ordered. TT. P.45, L. 7-12.

40. Facio moved out of the residence in September 1997. TT. P. 54, L. 3-4.
41. After Facio moved out, he did not pay any child support voluntarily. TT. P. 58,
L. 14-21.
42. Facio never paid his one half of the uninsured medical expenses. TT. P. 77.
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43. Live Oak home was appraised in 1992 at $135,000 and again at the time of
bifurcation at $216,000. TT. P. 84 L. 6 - TT. P. 85 L. 13.
Burge Cross Examination
44. When questioned about whether during the parties' entire marriage all of the
property was titled solely in Burge's name, Burge informed the Court that the E Street
home was jointly titled, as were some retirement accounts. TT. P. 116, L. 10-17.
45. Burge did not enforce the terms of the Order relating to Facio's financial
obligations to her. TT. P. 118 L. 20 to P. 120, L. 5.
46. Facio moved back into the home after having written her the letter dated
March 31st. TT. P. 129, L. 18 to P. 130, L. 1.
47. Facio did not do any of the things he promised in the letter. TT. P. 130, L. 6-8.
48. Based on the Order, the parties had divided everything. TT.P132,L24 to P
133, L. 5.
49. Burge took advantage of Facio's flight benefits after asking Facio if it was
okay to do so while legally separated. TT. P. 137, L. 4-7.
Burge Re-Direct Examination
50. After the Order, Burge invested $30,000.00 in improvements to the Live Oak
home from her separate funds. TT. P. 140, L. 4-10.
51. After the Order, Burge paid down the principal on the note on the Live Oak
home from her separate funds. TT. P. 140, L. 22-24.
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52. Facio owed $11,500.00 in back child support from the time of the Order until
he moved back into the home. TT. P. 141, L. 5-8.
53. Facio owed $4,000.00 in child support for Paul from September 1997 through
June, 1999. TT. P. 141, L. 20-22.
54. Facio owed $500.00 in child support for Ashley from September, 1997
through June of 1998 when she turned 18 years old. TT. P. 141, L. 23 to P. 142, L. 2.
55. Facio owed $1,000.00 for his portion of uninsured medical expenses for the
minor children from September, 1997 forward. TT. P. 142, L. 3-11.
56. Facio owed approximately $500.00 for day care for the parties minor son from
September, 1997 forward. TT. P. 142, L. 13-16.
57. When Facio moved out of the home in September, 1997 Burge gave him
$4,800.00 to move out of the home which he promised to repay but that she knew he
would not. TT. P. 142, L. 24 to P. 143, L. 9.
Facio Direct Examination
58. During the parties marriage, Facio was employed the entire time except of the
period of 1989. TT. P. 146, L. 9-11.
59. Facio was not represented by counsel at the time of the Order. TT. P. 152, L.
2-4.
60. Facio received $22,000.00 from the sale of the E Street property which he
spent. TT.P. 152, L. 18-24.

9
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61. Burge got approximately $26,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of the E
Street home. TT. P. 153, L. 8.
62. Facio moved back into the Live Oak home around Thanksgiving, 1993. TT.
P. 154, L. 21-23.
63. After Facio moved back into the Live Oak home he never referred to the
Order, because he "didn't think it existed. I just thought it went away, honestly." TT. P.
155, L. 8-15.
64. Once Facio moved back into the home, Burge pressured him to contribute
money to the household. TT. P. 155, L. 19-24.
65. Facio testified that he helped around the house. TT. P. 156, L. 1-12.
66. In September, 1997 Facio was earning about $7.00 per hour but at the time of
trial he was earning $12.85 per hour. TT. P. 159, L. 1-8.
67. In response to the question of when Facio moved back into the Live Oak home
were he and Burge living as man and wife, Facio stated, "Yeah, I thought we were-I
thought we were, you know, on our way to reconciling." TT. P. 162, L. 5-8.
68. Facio testified that nothing was different than it had been before. TT. P. 162,
L. 9-11.
Facio Cross Examination
69. Facio first employed the services of Brian Barnard as his attorney in the
1980's. TT.P. 166, L. 1.

10
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70. Facio consulted with Mr. Barnard about a variety of legal matters including
the initial 1991 divorce proceeding. TT. P. 166, L. 4-6.
71. Facio did not recall whether he discussed the divorce or separate maintenance
action with Barnard. TT. P. 167, L. 6-13.
72. Facio was aware that he could have sought legal counsel.TT. P. 167, L. 18-19.
73. Facio had not filed tax returns since 1989. TT. P. 168, L. 5-9.
74. Facio's income was provable ised on his W-2fs. TT. P. 168, L. 20-23.
75. When Facio wrote the letter, he promised to change his behavior before the
parties' lives could go on together. TT. P. 169, L. 11-13.
76. Facio did not accomplish the changes he promised to make. TT PI70, L10-13.
Facio Re-Direct Examination
77. While living in the Live Oak home, Burge came up to Facio one day and said
"Don't hurt me anymore." and asked him to put her wedding ring back on her hand. TT.
P. 174, L. 11-14.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the notice of appeal was
prematurely filed. Burge believes that the lower correctly ruled on the issues before it
and that this Court should affirm those rulings. Facio has completely failed to marshal
the evidence. This Court must assume the correctness of those findings of fact. Further,
the Court correctly applied the law in this case within the normal bounds of its discretion

11
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in property distribution cases of divorce. Finally, because the majority of the property
issues contained in the Order of Separate Maintenance were executed, regardless of the
lower court's determination of reconciliation, such provisions would not have in any way
been impacted.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL
BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS PREMATURELY FILED.
This Court must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Facio's notice of

appeal was prematurely filed and therefore of no effect to confer jurisdiction upon this
Court.
Following a trial in this action, the Court entered its Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce on April 19, 2001. R. R. 307340.

Facio filed a pleading entitled "Objection to Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law" on April 25, 2001. R. 343-345. Specifically, Facio's objection in
stated the following basis for his objection:
3.
4.

5.

6.

Petitioner's counsel took 11 months to prepare the findings.
The Petitioner submitted the findings without providing Respondent an opportunity to
review them in violation of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. A
Notice to Submit was included with the filing.
The Respondent objects to nearly every paragraph of the 28 page document. The
document does not represent the testimony, evidence presented or findings of fact that
were made at the trial.
Respondent requests a hearing in this matter.

R. 343-345. On May 18, 2001, before the Court ruled on his objection, Facio filed his
Notice of Appeal. R. 347-348. On June 13, 2001, the Court entered its Second Amended
12
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and Amended Decree of Divorce without
objection from Facio. R. 350-384.
Facio's objection did not recite the rule or legal basis upon which it was filed.
Nonetheless, in Regan v. Blount. 978 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1999), the Court, in
considering a motion to reconsider and objection to amended order and judgment, stated,
"in essence, the appellant is seeking an amendment of the judgment and/or a new trial.
Accordingly, the motion and objection will be treated as either a Rule 52(b) motion to
amend the judgment or a Rule 59 motion for new trial, which, if timely, suspends the
appeal period until entry of the order denying it." Id_ Facio's objection to should be
treated as either a Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 Motion insofar as it requests an amendment of
the order. R. 344.
Assuming this Court does treat the objection as a Rule 52(b) motion to amend the
judgment, said motion was filed within ten days of the date of the entry of the Amended
Order making the motion timely. Because Facio filed a timely Rule 52(b) motion to
amend the judgment, said motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal, thereby
rendering "a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of such motion by entry of a signed
order ineffective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court." Anderson v.
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah App. 1988). "To vest jurisdiction in the
appellate court, the notice of appeal must be filed after the entry of the order disposing of
such motions." Swenson Assoc. Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994).
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Facio filed the notice of appeal before an order disposing of his post trial motion.
Such a filing does not confer jurisdiction on this court. Therefore, this Court must
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiciton.
After the filing of the objection, Second Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce were entered. These were sent to
counsel for Facio on May 25, 2001 containing a Notice addressing the right to object to
the order pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. No objection
was filed. The only reasonable conclusion is that whatever objections Facio had with the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were resolved. The failure of Facio
to object to these Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second
Amended Decree of Divorce constituted a waiver of his earlier filed objection.
It was then Facio's duty to file a notice of appeal from the entry of the final order,
i.e. the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended
Decree of Divorce within thirty days of the date of their entry. Facio did not. Therefore,
not only does this Court lack jurisdiction based on the prematurely filed appeal which
must result in dismissal, but that dismissal must be with prejudice because the time to file
a new notice of appeal has run.
II.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE.
Appellant has challenged many of the factual findings made by the trial court. To

establish clear error and thereby merit reversal, an appellant must marshal the evidence in
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support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
"Successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate courts how the
trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such findings contradict the
weight of the evidence." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc.. 872
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). Where an appellant challenges findings of fact, but
fails to marshal the evidence as required, this Court must "refuse to consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting
Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989).
Appellant has not even remotely attempted to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings. He has simply argued some of the disputed evidence which he
believes supports his position. This Court must accept the findings as valid.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
DID NOT INTEND TO DISSOLVE THE ORDER OF SEPARATE
MAINTENANCE AND THAT THEY HAD NOT EFFECTUATED A
COMPLETE AND VOLUNTARY RECONCILIATION AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 30-4-3(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
The District Court correctly found that the parties had not reconciled. The

Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251
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(UtahApp. 1989).
The Court found that the Order of Separate Maintenance was not dissolved when
the parties lived together. Specifically, the Court first noted that pursuant to Section 304-3(3), Utah Code Annotated that it could change the provisions of an Order for Separate
Maintenance and may terminate the order altogether "upon satisfactory proof of voluntary
and permanent reconciliation." The Court then examined two prongs of the analysis
including (1) was it the intention of the parties to dissolve the order of separate
maintenance and (2) was there satisfactory proof of a voluntary and permanent
reconciliation. TT. P. 20 to P. 191, L. 2.
The trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, is in the best position to resolve
disputed testimony. On review, appellate courts are "obliged to view the evidence and all
inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of thefindingsof the
trier of fact. Thefindingsand judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when they
are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence." Nupetco Associates v.
Jenkins.. 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983) (quoting Car Doctor. Inc. v. Belmont. Utah, 635 P.2d
82, 83-84 (1981)). There was substantial, competent, admissible evidence which
supported the trial court's finding concerning the parties' intentions regarding the
dissolution of the Order. Burge testified that it was never the intention of the parties to
dissolve this Order. See TT. P. 45, L. 20-24 & P. 46, L. 19-21. In contrast, Facio
testified that he assumed that once he moved back into the home, the Order was done.

16
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See TT. P. 155, L. 8-15. The trial court, sitting as the finder of facts appropriately
weighed the credibility of the witnesses. Yelderman v. Yelderman. 669 P.2d 406, 408
(Utah 1983) ("it is within the province of the fact finder to believe those witnesses or
evidence it chooses"). Based on its role as the finder of fact, the Court made its findings
based on substantial, competent admissible evidence that it was not the intentions of the
parties to dissolve the order of separate maintenance.
The trial court further found by their conduct that the parties had not reconciled but
merely attempted a reconciliation. This too was supported by substantial, competent
admissible evidence. Burge permitted Facio to move into the home solely based on his
conditional promises to make changes that if effectuated would permit the parties to
attempt a reconciliation. See TT. P. 50, L. 6-13; P. 89, L. 1-19; R. 137; P. 129, L. 18 to P.
130, L. 1. Facio admitted that Burge permitted him to move back into the home based on
his March 31st letter wherein he promised to make certain behavioral changes. TT. P. 90,
L. 17-23; P. 169, L. 11-13. Both Burge and Facio admitted that Facio never made those
promised changes upon which any future reconciliation would be based. TT. P. 51 L. 1523; P. 90, L. 23; P. 130, L. 6-8; and P. 170, L. 10-13.
Utah case law is virtually non-existent on the issue of the impact of reconciliation
on an Order for Separate Maintenance. First, whether a reconciliation occurred is a
finding of fact. Anderson v. Anderson, 181 P. 168 (Utah 1919). In Lund v. Lund, 315
P.2d 856 (Utah 1957), the Court in discussing the impact of reconciliation on an
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interlocutory decree, stated, "the order set aside and vacated the interlocutory decree for
the reasons that the parties had become reconciled and any misconduct giving ground for
the said interlocutory decree had been condoned and forgiven and the reconciliation was
without any condition and the subsequent misconduct complained of did not revive the
i
interlocutory decree." Id Lund implicitely adopts a position that reconciliation does not
occur where there are conditions precedent to its completion which go unperformed.
Such was true in the instant case.
A survey of the law of other jurisdictions reveals that the majority rule is that
whether a reconciliation occurred is a matter of the parties intentions.l Thus, while Utah
has not ruled on this issue, it should follow the majority of those jurisdictions which have
determining that whether a reconciliation has been completed is a factual question
hinging on the parties'intentions.
In the instant case, the Court heard disputed testimony concerning the parties'
intentions regarding any potential reconciliation. It was within the trial court's discretion
to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and make itsfindingsbased thereon. So long as
those findings were supported by substantial competent admissible evidence, on appeal
such findings must be upheld. The Court had substantial, competent, and credible

'See e.g. Muschesko v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21,26 (Az. App. Div. 1 1997); Morgan v. Morgan,
234 P.2d 782, 784 (Cal. 1951); In re: Marriage of Reeser. 635 P.2d 930, 932 (Co. App. 1981); Wood v.
Wood. 309 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C. App. 1973); Prime v. Dring. 956 P.2d 1301, 1308 (Hawaii App. 1998);
Miller v. Miller. 616 P.2d 313, 316 (Mont. 1980); Brazina v. Brazina. 558 A.2d 69, 71 (N.J. Super. Ch.
1989); Young v. Young. 34 S.E.2d 154,156 (NC 1945); and Roberts v. Pace. 67 S.E.2d 844 (Va 1951).
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evidence upon which it based its determination that no reconciliation was effectuated.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE ORDER OF
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE WAS AN ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENT.
The District Court correctly found that the Order of Separate Maintenance was an

arms length agreement. The Standard of Review is that findings of fact in divorce
appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such that due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989).
The Court made the following statement on the record concerning this issue:
The Court finds that the order was entered into at arm's length by two educated, sophisticated
people. Whether or not Mr. Facio ever asked Mr. Barnard to review the matter is unclear to the
Court, but certainly he knew of Mr. Barnard, he had referred to him in the past and had every
opportunity to do so.
It's the Court's view that there's no suggestion of undue influence or anything inappropriate in
that agreement, and looking at it on the face of it, it is fair and seems to be evenhanded, and
something that would have been structured between two parties represented by Counsel,
attempting to work out a fair relationship between the two of them." TT. P. 192, L. 12-23.

A transaction between spouses is generally not judged by the same standards
which apply to nonrelated parties. Nonetheless, such transactions are enforced, if the
parties operated with "the highest degree of good faith, honesty, and candor in connection
with the negotiation and execution of such agreements." In re Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343,
1347 (Utah 1994) (quoting Huckv.Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)). The Court
perhaps mislabeled the transaction as being one at "arm's length" meaning in this context
that the transaction was negotiated, executed and performed in good faith, honesty and
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candor. Any mislabeling of the transaction was harmless error.2
Y.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT FACIO FAILED
TO PERFORM CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE POTENTIAL
RECONCILIATION.
The District Court correctly found that Facio failed to perform his promised

conditions precedent to the parties potential reconciliation. Even assuming arguendo that
the parties had entered into a present agreement to reconcile, "When one party to a valid
contract commits an "uncured material failure' in its performance of the contract, the
non-failing party is relieved of its duty to continue to perform under the contract."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §237(1981). Failure of a material condition
precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform. See 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 628, at 16 (1960) and § 630, at 20-21. Based on the foregoing
substantial, competent admissible evidence, the Court correctly found that the promises
were a condition precedent to a reconciliation which conditions were never met or
performed by Facio. TT. P. 191, L. 9-19.
Facio's testimony alone supports this finding by the Court. He admitted that his
move back into the home was conditional. TT. P. 162, L 5-8. Facio further admitted that
he didn't perform the promised conditions. TT. P. 170, L. 10-13. Burge's testimony as
noted above further supported the Court's conclusion.

2

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) ('"Harmless error' is defined . . . as
an error that is 'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)))
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VI.

THE PROPERTY DIVISION CLAIMS ARE ESSENTIALLY MOOT
BASED ON THE FACT THAT THEY WERE EXECUTED UNDER THE
ORDER OF SEPARATE MAINTENANCE.
The property division claims are essentially moot based on the fact that they were

executed under the order of separate maintenance. The Standard of Review concerning
whether the order provisions were executed is a mixed question of fact and law which this
Court review's the trial court's legal conclusion for correctness and its factual findings for
clear error. State v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Utah 1997).
The majority of cases involving Orders for Separate Maintenance Agreements and
reconciliation hold one thing uniformly. To the extent that any of the provisions of an
Order for Separate Maintenance are executed, they remain enforceable regardless of the
subsequent conduct of the parties.3 Because the majority of the property provisions in the
Order were executed, any subsequent conduct by the parties (including reconciliation)
were irrelevant to those provisions.
Burge believes that the following provisions were completely executed at or soon
after the entry of the Order4:
2.
3.

Awarding Burge the Live Oak residence (R. 19-20);
Sale of the E Street residence and division of proceeds ( R-20);

3

See Muchesko v. Muchesko. 955 P.2d 21 (Az. App. 1997); Morgan v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 782
(Cal. 1951); In re: Marriage of Reeser. 635 P.2d 930 (Co. 1981); Cox v. Cox. 659 So.2d 1051 (Fla.
1995); Miller v. Miller. 616 P.2d 313 (Mont. 1980); Brazina v. Brazina. 588 P.2d 69 (NJ Super. Ch.
1989; Schultzv. Schultz. 420 SE2d 186 (NC App. 1992); Bourne v. Bourne. 521 SE2d 519 (SC App.
1999); Yeich v. Yeich. 399 SE2d 170 (Va App. 1990); and Kaminskv v. Kaminskv. 364 SE2d 799 (W.
Va. 1987).
4

The paragraph numbers following correspond to the paragraph numbering of the Order.

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
17.
19.

Personal Property division (R-20);
Automobile Division (R-20);
Burge awarded her stocks and securities (R-20);
Burge awarded IRA accounts and savings bonds (R-20);
Each party awarded their own retirement accounts (R-21);
Division of Debts (R-23);
Burge permitted to change her name to Burge (if she had ever been known as Facio)(R24).

The executed portions of the Order were done. Any conduct by the parties was of
no effect on these provisions of the Order.
The majority of the remaining provisions of the Order could be said to be
unexecuted. These provisions either were not contested in the divorce proceeding (i.e.
paragraph 10 relating to custody of the minor children) or resolved by statute (paragraph
11-Child Support; paragraph 12-children's medical expenses; paragraph 13-children's
medical insurance; paragraph 14-child support obligor's life insurance; paragraph 15-day
care expenses). Finally, there are two provisions which then remain unresolved
(paragraph 16-liability for individual debts after the date of the parties separation;
paragraph 18-allocation of state and federal tax exemptions).5 As argued below, the
Court's division of the marital estate which closely paralleled the Order was not an abuse
of its discretion.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY EQUITABLY DIVIDED THE
MARITAL ESTATE.
The District Court correctly equitably divided the marital estate. The Standard of

5

These final two provisions were in fact partially executed during the period the parties lived
separately after the entry of the Order, but admittedly could have been considered unexecuted by the
Court for any period after Facio again resided in the Live Oak residence.
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Review is that trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and
property distributions in divorce cases, and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah
App. 1988).
The Court's division of property was supported by substantial, competent and
admissible evidence. Facio challenges only those provisions of the Decree which relate
to Real Property, Burge's Retirement, Alimony, and Furniture. Specifically, the Court
adopted much of the Order.6 The differences are set forth below:
Order
1. Burge gets Live Oak House/
Each party awarded their proceeds
from the sale of the E Street house;
2. Each party awarded their own retirement;
3. Neither party awarded alimony
4. Each awarded the personal property in
in their possession;

Decree
1. Each get same interest awarded in
the Order;
2. Each get same interest awarded in
the Order;
3. Neither party awarded alimony;
4. Each get same interest awarded the
Order.

This division was supported by the evidence. Burge testified extensively that the
Live Oak home was purchased with her separate funds for a down payment, that she paid
the mortgage payments and she paid for all of the improvements. TT. P. 34, L. 12- P. 35,
L. 4; P. 22, L. 8-15; P. 56, L. 1-23. Facio and Burge testified that each was awarded their
own retirement account. TT. P. 40,1. 10-24. Both testified that Facio spent the proceeds
of his account. TT. P. 41, L. 2-17. It would be completely inequitable to permit Facio to
6

Burge believes that all of these issues were executed portions of the Order except the alimony
provision.
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spend his retirement account and then compel Burge to divide hers. Burge testified that
she was awarded the furniture, it was still in her possession and that no new personal
property had been acquired after the date the parties lived together again. TT. P. 44, L. 21
to P. 45, L. 2.
Finally, the court properly denied the parties' alimony.7 While there was evidence
before the Court concerning the parties incomes, there was no evidence before the Court
concerning the other factors set forth in Section 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended). If these factors have been considered8, '"we will not disturb the trial court's
alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).
In the absence of such matters being introduced into evidence, there was no basis for the
Court to award either party alimony.
VIII. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD BURGE HER ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL.
This Court should award Burge her attorney fees on appeal. There is no basis for
this appeal either in law or in fact. Burge believes that if she substantially prevails on
appeal, she should be awarded her attorney fees. Generally, the prevailing party on
appeal in divorce cases is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Marhsall v. Marshall. 915

7

It is worth noting that Facio did not file a counterclaim in this action. He did not affirmatively
request the trial court award him alimony. Therefore he was not entitled to an award of alimony below.
8

It is improper for the Court to consider matters not introduced into evidence.

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996).
CONCLUSION
Facio's appeal was untimely filed. This Court lacks jurisdiction. It must dismiss
this appeal with prejudice. Facio has failed to marshall the evidence. This Court must
adopt the trial court's findings of fact. Facio received an equitable share of the marital
estate from the Order of Separate Maintenance including all of his retirement, $22,000.00
in cash from equity in a home and other personal items. The trial court properly found
that the parties did not reconcile and that the Order was not dissolved. The majority of
the property issues contained in the Order were executed and therefore not impacted in
anyway by the parties' conduct subsequent to their execution. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in the manner in which it divided the remaining marital estate. This
Court should affirm the trial court's findings, conclusions and decree.

Dated and Signed this {3_ day of

y^OQ^

2001

ower
ey for Petitioner/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this the | ^ d a y of
J>Q&i , 2001,1 caused two
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing document to be mailedto the person named
below, first class postage prepaid:
JH^
Mr. David P. Larson
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE,
WADE & SMART
341 South Main Street, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
The following are attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as
Addendum to Appellee's Brief:
Statutes:
30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
Documents
Order for Separate Maintenance
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Amended Decree of Divorce
Objection
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
Second Amended Decree of Divorce
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obUgations, or liabilities and regarding the parties, separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated Dy the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
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(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been fjreatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court maty consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by OCR,
the party
paying
Machine-generated
may contain
errors. alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.

30-4-3,

Custody and maintenance of children — Property
and debt division — Support payments.

(1) In all actions brought under this chapter the court may by order or
decree:
(a) provide for the care, custody, and maintenance of the minor children
of the parties and may determine with which of the parties the children or
any of them shall remain;
(b) (i) provide for support of either spouse and the support of the minor
children remaining with that spouse;
(ii) provide how and when support payments shall be made; and
(iii) provide that either spouse have a lien upon the property of the
other to secure payment of the support or maintenance obligation;
(c) award to either spouse the possession of any real or personal
property of the other spouse or acquired by the spouses during the
marriage; or
(d) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
!
(i) specify which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities contracted or incurred by the parties during
the marriage;
(ii) require the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, and liabilities and
regarding the parties , separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provide for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The orders and decrees under this section may be enforced by sale of any
property of the spouse or by contempt proceedings or otherwise as may be
necessary.
(3) The court may change the support or maintenance of a party from time
to time according to circumstances, and may terminate altogether any obligation upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation. An
order or decree of support or maintenance shall in every case be valid only
during the joint lives of the husband and wife.
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AUG 2 8 1992
Louise T. Knauer, #4066
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-6300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BEVERLY ANN BURGE (FACIO),
Plaintiff,

im&wr

ORDER FOR
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

vs.
Civil No.: 924903403SM
GARY THOMAS FACIO,
Judge: John A.

Defendant•
THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable John A. Rokich on
August 25, 1992, at the hour of 9:10 a.m.

Plaintiff was present

in Court and represented by counsel, Louise T. Knauer. Defendant
was not present in Court.

The Court noted that the Defendant had

executed an Acceptance of Service Consent and Waiver agreeing to
the terras contained in the Complaint for Separate Maintenance filed
herein.
Upon the basis of record herein, and pursuant to the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in this matter, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded an Order for Separate Maintenance

to become final upon signing and entry.
2.

During the parties1 marriage Plaintiff acquired a home

located at 2869 Live Oak Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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Plaintiff

used non-marital assets and a loan from her mother for the down
payment on the home.

The home, including all reserve accounts

associated therewith, is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and
separate property subject to her assuming the obligations for the
mortgage.
3.

The parties acquired

real property

located

at 318 E

Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff quit-claimed that property
to Defendant prior to its sale.

That property has been sold, and

the parties have divided the net proceeds in a manner which is fair
and equitable.

Each party is awarded the sum he or she received

as sole, separate property, subject to no claim from the other.
4.

The personal property of the parties is av/arded in a

manner which the parties determine to be fair and equitable.
5.

Defendant is awarded the 1990 Honda Civic automobile,

subject to debt thereon, and is ordered to indemnify and hold
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
Van.

Plaintiff is av/arded the 1936 Toyota

The Van is collateral for a debt incurred by Defendant.

Within six months of the signing of the Acceptance of Service,
Consent

and Waiver, Defendant

is ordered

to pay off the loan

secured by the Van, and provide Plaintiff v/ith title to the Van.
6.

Plaintiff is awarded all stocks and other securities in

Plaintiff's name.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded all I.R.A. accounts and all savings

bonds in her name, and the I.R.A. account presently held jointly.
2
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8.

Each party is awarded the retirement accounts in his or

her name.
9.

Each party is fully capable of supporting hin or herself.

Therefore no award of alimony is made to either party.
10.

Both parties are fit and proper persons to be awarded

joint legal custody of the minor children of the parties and it is
fair and reasonable that the parties be awarded joint legal custody
of the minor children. ' Plaintiff has been the primary caretaker
of the children, and it is in the best interest of the children
that she be awarded their physical custody, subject to reasonable
and liberal visitation in Defendant.
11.

Defendant is ordered to pay child support to Plaintiff

in the amount of $250 each month, until September 1, 1992. For the
period September 1992 through September 1993, Defendant is ordered
to pay child support in the amount of $500.

These sums shall

include payment of Defendant'r. obligation to assist in payment ol
day care for the children.

Each party

is ordered to provide

his/her tax returns and documentation concerning business expenses
to the other on or before May 31 of each year, beginning in 1993.
Aftc:i said documentation has been exchanged, it is ordered that the
child support figure be reevaluated, based on the parties1 incomes.
In the event that the parties can not reach an agreement on the
child support amounc, the matter may be brought before the Court
in an Order to Show Cause proceeding, and the parties will not need
3
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to file a Petition to Modify to adjust child support. The support
for each child must continue until that child should die, marry,
or reach the age of majority and finish high school, whichever
event first occurs-

Defendant is ordered to pay his child support

obligation by the first of each month.
12.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay the routine medical expenses

for the children. Each party is ordered to be responsible for onehalf of the payment of extraordinary medical and dental expenses
of the children of the parties until said children should die,
marry or reach the age of majority and

finish high school,

whichever should first occur.
13.
dental,

Plaintiff is ordered to procure and maintain health,
and

hospitalization

insurance

through

her

place

of

employment for the benefit of the children of the parties until
said children should die, marry or reach the age of majority and
finish high school, whichever should first occur.

In the event

that Plaintiff is unable to provide such insurance through her
workplace, Defendant is ordered to provide insurance if it is
available to him through his workplace. If neither party has
insurance available through their employment, they must each pay
one-half of the premiums necessary to provide health insurance for
the parties' minor children.
14.

Defendant

is ordered

to procure

and

maintain

insurance designating Plaintiff as the sole and absolute
4
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life

beneficiary in the amount of $100,000. Said life insurance policy,
or one for at least as much, to remain in force uwcil the youngest
child of the parties turns eighteen (18) years of age, and finishes
high school.
15.

Beginning on October 1, 1993, Plaintiff and Defendant.

are ordered to share equally the child care expenses necessitated
by the employment of the custodial parent.

Defendant is ordered

to pay his half of day care costs to Plaintiff on or before the
first day of each month.
16.

Each party

is ordered

to pay their

individual debts

subsequent to the date of separation, the 16th day of May, 1991,
and hold the other harmless therefrom.

In addition, Defendant has

paid the debt on the 318 E Street residence since May of 1991, and
is fully responsible for any outstanding debts or obligations en
that

property.

Defendant

is

ordered

to

indemnify

and

hold

Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
17.

The debts of the parties are allocated as follows:
a.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay, and hold

Defendant

harmless from the $7,000 Loan owed to Alice Burge.
b.

Effective May 16, 1991, Defendant is ordered to pay,

and hold Plaintiff harmless from, the following debts:

Two

obligations to the University of Utah Credit Union,
respectively identified as loans numbered 43966-7-1 and 4o°'o7-2; and Mountain America Credit Union.

Any past due amounts

5
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on these debts are the responsibility of Defendant.
c.

Defendant

is

ordered

to

pay

any

debts

not

specifically mentioned and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
18.

Plaintiff is awarded the claim of the Federal and State

income tax exemptions for the children of the parties.
19.

Plaintiff

has not taken

Defendant's

name during the

marriage, and has continued to use the surname '"Burge".

She is

permitted to continue to use that name, or, in the event that she
has ever been known by the name Beverly Facio, she is restored her
maiden name of Beverly Burge.
20.

Each party is ordered to execute such deeds, contracts,

agreements or other conveyances as may be necessary to transfer the
property or things awarded herein to the parties hereto.
21.

The Court should issue an Order to Withhold and Deliver

consistent with section 62A-11-401 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended, pursuant to which the child support awarded
herein shall be withheld from Defendant's income by his employer,
and paid over directly to Plaintiff.
DATED this

v i

day of

'* . • , . ^ *

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable John A. Rokich
District Court Judge
I.CTCOURT.SALTUKEOOUNTY^IAreOT
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339'
Attorney at Law
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8920
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio),
Petitioner,
v.

•

•

GARY THOMAS FACIO,

,
Respondent.

;
)
])
]

)

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 92.4903403DA

])•

JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

])

Commissioner Michael S. Evans

This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 3 0th day
of May, 2000. Petitioner, BEVERLY ANN BURGE was present before the Court and was
represented by her counsel, Connie L. Mower. Respondent, GARY THOMAS FACIO was present
before the Court and was represented by his counsel, David Larsen. Both parties were sworn in and
testified, and various pieces of documentary evidence were admitted into evidence. The Court
having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the evidence in this matter
thereafter made the following Findings of Fact:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were each residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah"

three (3) months before the filing of this Amended Complaint for Divorce.
2.

4 ;

^

Petitioner and Respondent were wife and husband having been married on March

16, 1974 in Wellington, Ohio.
3.

-

During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences developed between

the parties making continuation of the marriage impossible.
4.

Two (2) children were born as issue of the marriage, to wit: ASHLEY ALISON

BURGE FACIO, born March 31,1980, now twenty (20) years of age and PAUL MARLIN BURGE
FACIO, born April 20,1987, now thirteen (13) years of age. The children have resided continuously
with Petitioner throughout their minority and the youngest remains in her physical custody as of the
date of the trial. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded custody of the remaining minor
child, subject to Respondent's right of reasonable visitation.
5.

Prior to her marriage to Respondent, Petitioner obtained her Bachelor's Degree in

journalism in Ohio. Within several days of their marriage, Petitioner and Respondent moved to the
State of Utah, because Respondent had been accepted at the University of Utah to complete his
Bachelor's Degree.
6.

Both parties were substantially employed throughout the marriage. When

Petitioner first arrived in Utah, she took a variety of temporary jobs to assist in supporting the family.
She was later employed by the University of Utah to write a medical history book. Then Petitioner
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accepted employment as a communications director for the United Way.

Following that

employment, Petitioner was employed in the communications department at Questar, formerly
known as Mountain Fuel. In 1982, Petitioner accepted employment at the U.S. Postal Service and
continues to work for the U.S. Postal Service today. Petitioner has worked in a variety of capacities
for the U.S. Postal Service but in the most recent years has been working in middle management.
At the time of the trial, Petitioner earned the sum of $5,000.00 per month from her employment with
the U.S. Postal Service.
7.

Following his move to Utah, Respondent had multiple careers and job

opportunities. He delivered blood on an emergency basis for the Red Cross. He was employed for
a period of time by Salt Lake County as a real estate appraiser. Respondent thereafter changed
careers and began working as a camera operator for Channel 2, KUTV. After a period of time,
Respondent switched employers and commenced working for Channel 5, KSL TV. Originally he
was employed as a camera operator, but ultimately worked his way up to the position of director.
In approximately 1982, Respondent quit his job at KSL TV and took employment at a TV station
in Phoenix as a director. After approximately one year, Respondent returned into the Salt Lake City
area and resumed working for KSL TV as a camera operator. Respondent then terminated his
employment with KSL and worked as afreelancecamera operator. Thereafter, Respondent sold real
estate and for a time, collected unemployment As his real estate career was unsuccessful, Respondent
accepted employment at Continental Airlines in 1996, working in the reservation department.
Respondent is presently employed by Continental Airlines and earns the sum of $2,978.00 per
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Burge v. Facio, Case iNo. 924903403
Page 4

month.
8. Respondent completed his Bachelor's Degree at the University of Utah after approximately
sixteen (16) years study. Respondent further completed an independent film school and then
completed a course of study to qualify as a real estate agent.
9.

'^v

Although both parties are currently employed on a full-time basis, Respondent is

not working or earning at his highest potential. Respondent has had multiple career changes during
the course of his marriage, which were precipitated primarily by his dissatisfaction with his
employers and the] obs themselves. Respondent has multiple talents which could be used to improve
his employability: he is educated, he is intelligent, he is creative, he has particular skills in dealing
with people and he has multiple interests. Respondent, however, shows little follow through in his
plans and ideas and is now employed at a level less than his abilities would allow. Respondent is
underemployed.
10.

Petitioner retained an attorney on three separate occasions to obtain a divorce from

Respondent. The first time was in 1982, the second in 1991, and the third in 1997. In approximately
1981, the Petitioner and Respondent separated, and in 1982 the Respondent accepted employment
in Arizona. Prior to the parties' separation, Petitioner believed that Respondent was financially
irresponsible and creating unnecessary debt for the family. The Respondent had moved out of state,
and had little contact with the Petitioner or their infant daughter. The Petitionerfiledfor divorce in
1982. However, after Respondent began contacting the Petitioner, the Petitioner ultimately
dismissed that action. The parties reconciled, and in approximately 1983, the respondent moved
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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back to the state of Utah and commenced residing with the Petitioner.
12. The parties separated again in 1991. Petitioner commenced the new divorce action
because she discovered that Respondent had surreptitiously cashed in various IRAs funded by
Petitioner and from gifts from her family. Petitioner further discovered that Respondent had secretly
liquidated the college fund established by Petitioner for the parties' oldest child. Respondent had
secretly incurred numerous debts for his own personal use and not the family. Respondent had failed
and refused to file his federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner was concerned that
Respondent's spendthrift habits and inability to control his indebtedness would result in financial
ruin for herself and the children. Petitioner was further concerned about the Respondent's failure
to file the federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner worried that the family's financial
condition could be jeopardized by unpaid taxes, penalties and interest.
13.

More importantly however, Petitioner was concerned with the dishonesty that

surrounded Respondent and all his financial dealings. Respondent lied about his spending and his
dissipation of assets.

He failed to come forward with the truth until directly confronted by

Petitioner. Although Respondent pledged to correct his behavior, he never did. Petitioner instructed
her counsel, Louise Knauer, to prepare a Complaint for Divorce. Petitioner's counsel, in fact,
prepared such a Complaint. A copy of the Complaint was delivered to Respondent. Respondent did
not want to be divorced. Respondent pleaded with Petitioner to seek some other solution to their
financial instabilities other than divorce. Respondent wanted the marriage to continue, and
ultimately, Petitioner was convinced by Respondent that she should seek an Order for Separate
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Maintenance. An Order of Separate Maintenance; Respondent told Petitioner, would separate the
parties' assets and debts and would protect her financially from his debts and obligations while
preserving the marriage between the parties. Petitioner instructed her counsel to amend the
complaint from divorce to separate maintenance. That action was filed on the 11th day of August,
1992. Respondent thereafter executed an Acceptance, Waiver and Consent in which he agreed that
the Court could enter an Order consistent with Petitioner's Complaint for Separate of Maintenance.
On or about August 28, 1992, an Order for Separate Maintenance was signed and entered by the
Court.
14.

Petitioner testified that prior to executing the Acceptance, Waiver and Consent,

Respondent acknowledged to her that he Had consulted with his attorney Brian Barnard, who
suggested changes to the terms of the Complaint to bring the terms in compliance with recent
changes in the law. As further evidence of Respondent's consultation with Mr. Barnard on the
Divorce and then the Separate Maintenance action, Petitioner testified that Respondent told her that
Mr. Barnard could not give her advice on a separate legal matter due to the pending action between
the parties. On the stand, Respondent denied speaking to his attorney about the Order of Separate
Maintenance. However, documentary evidence established that Respondent consulted at this time
with Mr. Barnard about a divorce. Additionally, Respondent acknowledged that Brian Barnard had
represented him in certain proceedings in the 1980's and further that Mr. Barnard represented him
in this action commencing in 1998. The Court credited Petitioner's testimony and found it
persuasive. Even if he had not, Respondent was intelligent enough and informed enough to know
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that he could seek legal counsel prior to agreeing to the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
15.

In the Order of Separate Maintenance, the Court ordered among other things:
A.

Petitioner and Respondent were awarded the joint legal custody of the
parties' minor children. Petitioner was awarded sole physical custody,
subject to the Respondent's right of liberal and reasonable visitation.

B.

Respondent was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per
month until September 1992. From September 1992, through September of
1993, Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $500.00 per month as and
for child support. This included his contribution for day care. Petitioner and
Respondent were ordered to exchange income tax returns and income
documentation beginning in 1993 and to recalculate in 1993, child support
based upon the parties' incomes.

C.

Petitioner was ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the
benefit of the minor children. Petitioner was further ordered to pay all
routine medical expenses incurred for the children. However, each party was
ordered to pay one-half (V2) of any payment of extraordinary medical and
dental expenses for the minor children.

D.

Beginning October 1, 1993, Respondent was ordered to equally share in the
child care expenses incurred by Petitioner related to her employment on or
before the first day of each month.
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E.

'

The Court divided the debts between the parties, assigning to Petitioner an
equitable share of the marital debts and to Respondent, his separate personal
debts.

F.

1

Petitioner was awarded all right, title and interest in the residence, located at
2869 Live Oak Circle, titled exclusively in her name because non-marital
assets and a loan from Petitioner's mother were used to acquire the home.

G.

Prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, the parties sold the
marital residence located at 318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties
divided the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence in a fair and
equitable manner and the Court approved the division.

H.

The Court divided the parties' motor vehicles and entered orders with respect
to any debts owing thereon.

L

Petitioner was awarded all stocks or other securities in her name. Respondent
was awarded the stock in his name.

•L.

Petitioner was awarded all IRA's accounts and savings bonds in her name
and the IRA account which was held jointly between the parties.

K.

Each party was awarded the retirement accounts in his or her own names.

L.

Neither party was awarded alimony from the other.

M.

Various other orders were entered in the Order for Separate Maintenance
which are not particularly significant to the actions therein.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Burge v. Facio, Case No. 924903403
Page 9

16.

At the time of the parties' separation in 1991, each of the parties had acquired marital

and personal assets. Such assets include the following:
A.

In 1976, the parties acquired a marital residence and real property located at
318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The family lived in this residence until
approximately October, 1989, when Petitioner purchased the home on Live
Oak Circle from separate funds. The parties moved into the Live Oak home.
The parties attempted to lease the E Street home and were successful in doing
so for a period of time. However, because they were unable to find reliable
long-term tenants, the E Street home was vacant. When the parties separated
f

in 1991, Respondent moved from Petitioner's residence on Live Oak Circle
to the marital residence located on E Street. Even though Respondent was
employed and had earnings with which to meet his own expenses after
separation, Respondent failed to make the mortgage payments on the E Street
residence where he was residing. In order to protect her credit, Petitioner was
forced not only to pay the mortgage on her residence on Live Oak Circle, but
likewise was forced to pay the mortgage obligation on the E Street residence
during Respondent's tenancy. After many months of paying both mortgage
obligations, Petitioner insisted that the E Street home be sold. Respondent
ultimately agreed. Petitioner executed a Quit Claim Deed to the residence to
Respondent and Respondent thereafter sold that property. From the sale of
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the E Street home, Respondent, who acted as his own real estate agent,
received gross proceeds in the amount of $48,000.00. Petitioner and
Respondent agreed that Respondent could retain all proceeds from the sale,
however Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner back for all the assets depleted
by him without her knowledge or consent while they were living together.
To satisfy this obligation, Respondent paid Petitioner the sum of $25,000.00.
Respondent kept the remaining proceeds. He spent the proceeds on a lap top,
car phone, clothing for himself, used some for living expenses and paid for
business expenses including a school for cash flow management in San
Diego, California for commercial real estate, The parties further agreed that
because the Live Oak Circle was titled exclusively in Petitioner's name and
because Petitioner had acquired this home using separate funds in the form
of gifts from her mother and a loan from her mother, that it was fair and
reasonable that Petitioner be awarded all right, title and interest in Live Oak
Circle.
B.

During the course of the marriage, the parties each acquired retirement
benefits through employment. Petitioner had acquired employment benefits
through the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired retirement benefits
through his employment at KSL TV. The parties agreed that each would be
awarded her or Ms own retirement benefits, subject to no claim in the other.
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C

Routinely during the course of the marriage, Petitioner received various gifts
and advances on her inheritance from her mother. She also received an
inheritance from her uncle in 1993 or 1994. When she received such gifts
and monies, Petitioner placed these funds into separate accounts titled in her
name alone (in the form of savings accounts, CD's, IRA's, mutual funds,
stocks and bonds.) These funds were never co-mingled with Respondent's
property after the separation in 1991. The parties thereafter agreed that it was
fair and reasonable that Petitioner retain as her separate property those
accounts acquired primarily from these gifts and/or advances on her
inheritance subject td no claim in Respondent.

D.

Early in the marriage, Respondent assisted in meeting the family's financial
needs and obligations. After 1989, Petitioner alone was forced to assume
and discharge all of the marital indebtedness that had jointly acquired by the
parties for the benefit of the family. Respondent paid none of these debts.
At the time of the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, most of the
joint marital indebtedness had been discharged by Petitioner. Petitioner was
therefore only ordered to pay and hold Respondent harmless on the loan from
her mother used as a partial down payment on the Live Oak home.
Respondent had acquired various non marital debts, including obligations on
two credit cards. These debts were not for a family purpose and were
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exclusively incurred by Respondent for his own benefit. Respondent agreed
to pay and hold Petitioner harmless from those debts.
17.

^

From 1991, until approximately end of 1993 or early 1994, the parties continued

to live separate and apart. Respondent repeatedly represented to Petitioner that he was working very
diligently to resolve his financial insolvency. Respondent repeatedly agreed or represented to
Petitioner that he had filed or was preparing to file the state and federal returns for all years in which
he had not. Respondent further continued to promise Petitioner that they would be able to reconcile
at some point in the future because of the improvements that he had made in his life. Petitioner and
Respondent again commenced with marital counseling trying resolve their differences. Respondent
also sought individual counseling. On or about March 31,1993, Respondent wrote Petitioner a letter
in which he again represented that he was "going to work on changing patterns in my personal
behavior that has been so damaging to our relationship". Respondent promised Petitioner that he
would talk about problems between the parties and to not avoid them. He promised that he would
do the things that he said he would do and do them in a timely fashion. He promised to pay his bills
on time, including his taxes. He promised, further, to remain monogamous.

In this letter,

Respondent invited Petitioner to resume joint counseling to repair the relationship. Respondent
proposed that the parties' potential reconciliation be a three step process." 1) burying past anger and
resentment 2) renewing a courtship between us and 3) deciding on a remarriage." In response to
Respondent's letter, Petitioner agreed to consider actual reconciliation if Respondent in fact followed
through on his commitment he detailed in the letter. The end of 1993 or early 1994, Petitioner
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learned that Respondent had lost his housing. Petitioner was concerned that Respondent would not
be able to find suitable replacement housing. Petitioner agreed to allow Respondent to move back
into her residence so that he could continue to work on the problems that led to the parties' initial
separation. Petitioner hoped, for the sake of her children, Respondent would be able to meet all the
commitments set forth in his letter of March 31, 1993. Both parties understood that just because
Petitioner allowed Respondent to move into her residence, that such did not mean the parties had
reconciled. According to the parties agreement actual reconciliation would be accomplished by a
remarriage. With that understanding, Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence.
18.

While Respondent lived with Petitioner, he continued to work in his various

occupations. Respondent was not a house husband. There was not a gender role reversal between
the parties wherein Petitioner was the bread winner and Respondent was responsible for the home
and children. Petitioner continued to be primarily responsible to attend to the children and all of
their needs. Petitioner cleaned the house, did the yard work, did the laundry, grocery shopping and
otherwise managed the household. Respondent did do small services for Petitioner. He painted a
wall in the basement. He clipped and shredded refuse from the lawn on one occasion. He planted
acorns to raise scrub oak trees. Respondent did do some chores around the house. Respondent did
attend to some of the children's needs when he was not working. However, Petitioner could not trust
Respondent to follow through with serious responsibilities and therefore did those herself. For
example, Respondent wanted to be responsible to take the parties son Paul to school. In 24 days,
Paul had 12 tardies. Petitioner resumed delivering the child to school herself.
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19.

In spite of the fact that Petitioner and Respondent resided under the same roof, the

parties still lived under the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance; in that the parties' financial
matters continued to be held separate from the other. Following the parties' separation in 1991,
Petitioner had closed the parties' joint account and established her own separate checking account.
Petitioner maintained the investments awarded to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance in
separate accounts. All of the household obligations were in Petitioner's name; Respondent assumed
no liability for these. Petitioner and the children lived a modest lifestyle. However, Petitioner set
aside further savings for the children's college and for her retirement in separate accounts. Petitioner
continued to pay for her home. The Petitioner filed separate tax returns yearly as head of household,
with the Respondent's Jknowledge. When Respondent moved into the residence, there was no
formal agreement as to how much he would contribute to the household to offset the additional
expenses for his residence in that home. Instead, Petitioner and Respondent agreed that he would
pay $500.00 per month for child support as though the parties were living separately. Petitioner paid
all of her liabilities for herself and the children and paid all bills with connection with the household
20.

Petitioner would not have allowed Respondent to live in her home without the

protection ofthe Order of Separate Maintenance insulating her income and assetsfromRespondent's
irresponsible financial behavior. Petitioner testified that on at least on a half dozen occasions, the
parties specifically discussed the fact that the Order of Separate Maintenance was still in place,
completely separating the parties assets and liabilities. Respondent told Petitioner, "The Order of
Separate Maintenance is there for your and the children's protection". "I want you to feel
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comfortable about money issues". Respondent never asked the Court to set aside the order because
he knew his financial problems were not resolved and the Petitioner never asked that the order be
lifted. Both parties relied on and implemented the provisions of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
For example, on one occasion, Petitioner attempted to obtain a home equity loan. When the
mortgage company obtained a credit report on Petitioner, a bill owing to Sears incurred separately
by Respondent appeared on her report. Respondent asked Sears to delete the credit report on this
account, because he and Petitioner were living under an "Order of Separate Maintenance" and
therefore, Petitioner could not be held liable for his debts. Because of the Order of Separate
Maintenance, Sears deleted the negative credit report on Petitioner's credit for the obligation owing
to them. Petitioner was then able to obtain a home equity loan in her own name.
21. Even though Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $500.00 per month child support while
he resided in her home from 1994 through September of 1997, Respondent only contributed
$5,600.00 to the children's support during that time period. Respondent made no other financial
contribution to the household. In fact, documentary evidence was admitted which substantiated the
fact that Respondent himself did not believe he had an ongoing financial obligation to Petitioner's
household and the children. In his Consumer Credit Counseling application, he did not list the
Petitioner as his spouse. He did not list any family bills, any payments toward a rent or mortgage
or even information regarding his obligation to his children.
22. Even though he had promised Petitioner that he would become financially solvent after
he moved in with her, Respondent continued to incur unnecessary indebtedness. Respondent failed
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to pay his personal monthly obligations on a timely basis and debt collection summonses and
subpoenas were delivered to the Respondent at the Live Oak address. Respondent's financial
condition was so poor that he sought the assistance of Consumer Credit Counseling to help him meet
his monthly obligations to his own personal creditors. Before his debts were paid off, Respondent
terminated his relationship with Consumer Credit Counseling. Respondent continued to avoid filing
of his tax returns. Respondent lead Petitioner to believe he had appointments with his accountant,
that he was gathering the financial information, that the returns were going to be filed. To the best
of Petitioner's information, Respondent had not filed taxes from 1990 to the present. Respondent
borrowed moneyfromPetitioner for his own needs. Each time, he promised he would pay her back.
Respondent never did. Respondent acknowledged under oath that he never met the conditions
agreed to for permanent reconciliation. In fact Respondent testified that doing so was still a "work
in progress". Respondent liquidated his KSL retirement in 1993/1994 and dissipated the proceeds.
Respondent acquired nothing from his income in terms of assets or cash to show from his
employment. Respondent was not monogamous. He continued to date and have girlfriends while
he lived with the Petitioner.
23.

Because of his failure to correct his behavior, Petitioner asked Respondent to

move out. Respondent told Petitioner he did not have any money to move out. Petitioner loaned
Respondent $1,800.00 to assist him in securing an apartment and another $3,000.00 to purchase a
car for transportation. Petitioner believed that this was the last time she would have to pay
Respondent money. Based upon Respondent's history of financial failure and irresponsibility,
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Petitioner did not expect repayment of the loan.
24.

Petitioner filed again for divorce on October 7, 1997. Various orders were

entered on a temporary basis.
25. On or about March 19,1999, this Court entered its Bifurcated Decree of Divorce granting
Petitioner a divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The financial issues raised in
this matter were bifurcated for further hearing before the Court.
26. Trial was held on May 30, 2000. The Court issued its ruling in open Court. Further
proceedings were held on August 4, 2000, to clarify the Courts ruling. At the time of trial,
Respondent did not dispute custody, child support, medical insurance, debt division, attorney's fees,
distribution of Petitioner's IRA's, stocks, bonds or other investments outlined in her financial
declaration. Respondent only contested the equity acquired in Petitioner's residence and division
of Petitioner's retirement accounts with the US Postal Service.
27. After trial, the Court made the following orders:
A. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded the sole care, custody and
control of the remaining minor child subject to Respondent's right of reasonable
visitation as the parties may agree but at a minimum, consistent with Utah Code
Annotated §30-3-35.
B. Effective June 1, 2000, Respondent was ordered to pay to Petitioner child
support in the sum of $270.84 per month which is consistent with the Utah Child
Support Guidelines, using gross income from Petitioner of $5,000.00 and gross
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.

income of Respondent of $2978.00. Respondent's child support obligation is
payable one-half on the 5th and the remaining one-half on the 20th of each calendar
month. Respondent's obligation should be ordered to continue until the minor child
reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last.
C. Petitioner should be ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the
benefit of the child. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-half of the child's per
capita share of the entire premium. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-hatf
of the non-covered medical bills incurred by the Petitioner for the child. Petitioner
should be ordered to provide proof at the end of each calendar month that she
incurred a non-covered cost by providing a copy of her insurance explanation of
benefits form. Respondent should be ordered to pay his one-half share within 30
days of receipt.
D. Due to the age of the remaining child, no further daycare will be incurred.
E. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner incurred various
debts and obligations which are detailed on her Financial Declaration which is filed with this Court.
Because these debts were incurred by Petitioner after the entry ofthe Order of Separate Maintenance,
they are separate debts. Petitioner should assume and discharge these debts and hold Respondent
harmless therefrom.
F. After the entry ofthe Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent incurred various
debts and obligations detailed on his Financial Declaration which is on file with this Court. Because
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Respondent incurred this indebtedness after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, these
debts are separate. Respondent shall assume and discharge these debts and hold the Petitioner
harmless therefrom.
28. Petitioner has acquired an interest in various IRA's, Stocks, bonds, and other investments.
Petitioner shall be awarded all right, title and interest in the American Century IRA, the SmithBarney IRA, the Key Bank IRA, the Charles Schwab IRA, the Co Bank Investment, Mass Investors
Gross Stock Fund A, AL Tel, RPM, Alliance Inc. Fund, National Auto Credit Inc., Transonic
Company, Traveler's, CSX, American General Corp, Vanguard 500 Index Fund, American Century
Ultra, Questar and Novell. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in these investments
because they were principally gifted to her or acquired prior to entry of the Order of Separate
Maintenance and because any contribution made thereafter, was made from Petitioner's separate
funds.
29. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in the residence located at 2963 Live Oak
Circle. Petitioner shall discharge the indebtedness on this residence and shall hold Respondent
harmless therefrom. The Court awards this property to Petitioner because it awarded this property
to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance entered in 1992 and because any contribution to the
equity since that time has been made from Petitioner's separate funds.
30. Petitioner has continued to acquire an interest in various pension and retirement through
her employment through the U.S. Postal Service. Petitioner was previously awarded those benefits
which were accumulated prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance in 1992. Petitioner
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is further awarded all right, title and interest in these accounts, which were accumulated after the
entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Petitioner is awarded this as her separate property
because she obtained these additional benefits through her separate funds.
31. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent acquired an interest
in certain pension and retirement benefits through his employment at Continental Airlines.
Respondent is awarded this property as his sole, and separate property, having been acquired from
his separate funds.
32. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner acquired an interest in
a savings and a checking account. Because those accounts were funded with separate funds from
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner is awarded all right/title
and interest in those accounts.
33. Petitioner sought judgment against Respondent for all unpaid child support due to her
after Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence. The Court denies that Petitioner's request for
judgment, finding that although Respondent only paid $5,600.00 of what would have exceeded
$35,000.00 in child support obligation, the Court will not grant child support if the parties were
residing under the same roof. However, Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner all unpaid child
support from 1992 until he moved into Petitioner's house. Therefore, judgment of $11,500.00
should enter against Respondent.
34. Petitioner and Respondent were each ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its Conclusions of Law:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter herein.
2. Petitioner shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony
between Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to
become final upon signing and entry.
3. Respondent did not contest the orders set forth in paragraphs 4-13 below, therefore, the
Court concludes that such orders are fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
4. Petitioner shall be awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child
to wit: PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, born April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded
reasonable rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of
Visitation contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines
to Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37.
5. Effective June 1, 2000, the parties' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $226.00 per month, which sum is
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support
obligations should be payable one-half (Vz) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half
QA) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever
occurs later.
6. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred
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Therefore, no ongoing order needs to be entered.
7. Respondent's obligation to pay child support should be paid through Automatic Wage
Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. seg. Any administrative fee
imposed to process Automatic Wage Withholding shall be collected from Respondent in addition
to his base child support obligations.
8. Effective June 1, 2000, Petitioner shall continue to be ordered to maintain a policy of
medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through
her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent
should each be ordered to pay one-half (l/2) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and
dental insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half QA) share is $16.45. Petitioner and
Respondent shall each be ordered to assume and pay one-half (/4) of all non-covered medical and
dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner shall be ordered to
provide written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical
and dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent should be ordered to pay
his one-half QA) share of the non-medical and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of
such documentation.
9. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance
policy on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor
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child as the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent should each
be enjoined and restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value
of such life insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates
from high school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and
beneficiary status on or about January 15th of each calendar year.
10. Petitioner shall be awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for
purposes of filing of federal and state income tax returns.
11.

Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a full time basis.

Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent should be awarded
alimony either now or in the future.

•

12. Each party should be awarded those items of personal property now in his or her
possession. Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal
property if he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing.
13. Each party should be awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name.
14. The Respondent contested at trial the legal effect of the Order of Separate Maintenance
entered on or about August 28, 1992.
15. In 1992 , Respondent was given a copy of the complaint for Separate Maintenance.
Respondent did not contest the relief requested. Respondent voluntarily executed an Acceptance,
Waiver and Consent, which gave the Court the authority to enter its orders consistent with the
Complaint
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16. Respondent consulted with his attorney, Brian Barnard, regarding the proposed terms
of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Respondent's execution of the Appearance, Waiver and
Consent was knowing.

**'*•

17. The Order of Separate Maintenance was the product of arms length negotiations between
the parties.

*'

18. Respondent is an intelligent, well-educated man, who is able to read and understand the
English language and could understand the terms of the Complaint for Separate Maintenance.
19. No duress, coercion or trickery was employed to induce the Respondent to agree to the
terms of the Separate Maintenance.
20. The Order of Separate Maintenance, which distributed the parties' assets and allocated
debts,, among other things, appears to be a fair, equitable and permanent settlement of the parties'
respective rights and obligations as they existed in 1991 and therefore, the order is res judicata as to
the property settlement and other issues addressed in the order because it was a valid order. The
Court will not redistribute property awarded under that order. Each of the parties received an
equitable portion of the equity in the marital residence jointly acquired through the marriage. The,
proceeds from the home on E Street were awarded to Respondent, provided that he paid to Petitioner
the sum of $25,000.00 to restore certain funds which the Respondent had dissipated during the
marriage. Respondent therefore received all of the equity in that residence. He cannot claim the
order was unfair to him. He later spent these funds on personal items and not family expenses.
Petitioner was awarded as her separate property the home located on Live Oak Circle. This home
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was primarily acquired with separate funds, those being gifts and loans from Petitioner's family.
Respondent made little or no contribution to this home and therefore, cannot claim the order was
unfair to him. The Court entered its Order awarding each of the parties those retirement and pension
benefits that she and he had individually acquired throughout the marriage. Petitioner had acquired
benefits through her employment with the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired benefits
through his employment and KSL TV. The division of retirement was not unfair to Respondent. The
Court further awarded each party his or her separate property, received through gift or inheritance,
which was un-commingled with the marital estate.
21. The Order of Separate Maintenance further divided the existing debts between the parties
in a fair and equitable manner. Petitioner was ordered to pay certain outstanding debts of the
marriage. Respondent was ordered to pay only his personal liabilities. The order is not unfair to
Respondent.
22. All remaining orders in the Order of Separate Maintenance appear to be fair and
reasonable and consistent with the law.
23. Once the Order for Separate Maintenance was entered, the parties financial affairs were
completely separated. Even though, Petitioner in 1993 or 1994, allowed Respondent to live under
her roof, the parties did not intend to dissolve the protections given under the Order of Separate
Maintenance. Both parties relied upon its provisions in conducting their financial affairs. The Court
was never asked by either party to change the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Neither
party petitioned the Court to terminate the obligations under the Order of Separate Maintenance.
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Upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation, the Court could have modified
or terminated the existing Order. However, under the evidence of this case, the Court finds, that the
"reconciliation" was not permanent not complete as required. It was tentative, provisional and
conditional based upon Respondent's promised performance to certain agreed conditions. Because
Respondent did not meet the stated conditions, no voluntary or permanent reconciliation took place.
24. From 1992 through 1997, the parties5 had separate finances. The parties maintained no
joint accounts. The parties did not maintain co-ownership of property or maintained joint
obligations. Respondent did not acquire a further marital interest in Petitioner's property
25. From 1992 to 1997, Petitioner met all of the needs of the household, including the minor
children,fromher separate income. Except that Respondent paid $5,600.00 as and for child support
during that period of time. Petitioner retained these funds but the Court will not grant Petitioner
further judgment for unpaid support during the time Respondent lived in the same house as the
children. Judgment should enter against Respondent for unpaid support from May 1991 to
December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves ruling on any other arrearage.
26. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the
Petitioner in the Order of Separate Maintenance.
27. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in retirement funds acquired by
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
28. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle should be denied.
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•

29. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to assume and pay his or her own
attorney's fees and costs.
30. Each party should be ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the
Amended Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

Ifl

day of UUO^ ])

2001.

RM^

W$\

HONORABLE WILLI
District Court Judge

NOTICE
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allowsfive(5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10)
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court.
DATED this 2(t;day of

yui^\

2001.

IE L. MOWER
ttorney for Petitioner
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339
Attorney at Law
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8920
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio),

]
)
])

AMENDED DECREE OF
DIVORCE

])

Case No. 924903403DA

*

])

JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

Respondent.

]i

Commissioner Michael S. Evans

Petitioner,
v.
GARY THOMAS FACIO,

This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 3 0th day
of May, 2000. The Court having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the
evidence in this matter and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for good
cause appearing, now therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between
Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final
upon signing and entry.
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2. Petitioner is awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child to wit:
PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, bom April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded reasonable
rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of Visitation
contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines to
Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37.

-^

3. Effective June 1, 2000, the parlies' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $226.00 per month, which sum is
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support
obligations should be payable one-half (Vi) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half
(Yz) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever
occurs later.
4. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred Therefore,
no ongoing order is entered.
5. Respondent's obligation to pay child support is ordered to be paid through Automatic
Wage Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. sea. Any administrative
fee imposed to process Automatic Wage Withholding are to be collected from Respondent in
addition to his base child support obligations.
6. Effective June 1,2000, Petitioner is ordered to continue to be ordered to maintain a policy
of medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Amended Decree of Divorce
Burge v. Facio Case No. 924903403 '
Page 3

her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent
are each ordered to pay one-half (14) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and dental
insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half (14) share is $16.45. Petitioner and
Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay one-half (14) of all non-covered medical and dental
expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner is ordered to provide
written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical and
dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent is ordered to pay his one-half
(14) share' of the non-medical, and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of such
documentation.
7. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance policy
on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor child as
the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent are each enjoined and
restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value of such life
insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high
school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and beneficiary
status on or about January 15th of each calendar year.
8. Petitioner is awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for purposes
of filing of federal and state income tax returns.
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9. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a foil time basis.
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent are awarded alimony
either now or in the future.
10. Each party is awarded those items of personal property now in his or her possession.
Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal property if
he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing.
11. Each party is awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name.
12. The Court will not grant Petitioner further judgment for unpaid support during the time
Respondent lived in the same house as the children. Judgment will enter against Respondent for
unpaid support from May 1991 to December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves*
ruling on any other arrearage.
13. Respondent is not awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the Petitioner
in the Order of Separate Maintenance.
14. Respondent is not awarded anyfartherinterest in retirement funds acquired by Petitioner
after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
15. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle is denied
16. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay his or her own attorney's
fees and costs.
17. Each party is ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the
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Amended Decree of Divorce.
DATED this ( ^

day of

,2001.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE WILLIAM B.'^OHUING
District Court Judge

NOTICE
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10)
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court.
DATED this *) Q^day of

2001.

L. MOWER
ttorney for Petitioner
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David P. Larson (#8066)
SNOW NUFFER
A Professional Corporation
341 South Main Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 538-0400
Facsimile (801) 538-0423
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BEVERLY ANN BURGE,
Petitioner,
vs.

OBJECTION TO AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GARY THOMAS FACIO,
Respondent.

Civil No. 924903403DA
Judge BOHLING
Commissioner EVANS

COMES NOW, the Respondent, through counsel, and objects to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Petitioner. The
objection is based on the following.
1. Petitioner's counsel took 11 months to prepare the findings.
2. The Petitioner submitted the findings without providing the
Respondent an opportunity to review them in violation of Rule 4-501 of the
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration. A Notice to Submit was included with
the filing.
3. The Respondent objects to nearly every paragraph of the 28 page
document. The document does not represent the testimony, evidence
presented or findings of fact that were made at the trial.
4. Respondent requests a hearing in this matter.

DATED THIS ^ 1 day o R " i f T L ^ C .

2001

SNOW NUFFER
A Professional Corporation

David P. Larson
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
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I hereby certify that on the^pJ^p day of X-LyA 1 -^

2001, I served a

copy of the foregoing on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S.
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Third District Court Clerk
450 S. State
P.O. Box 1860
5alt Lake City, Utah 84111

Connie Mower Esq.
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Secretary
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SNOW NUFFER
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys at Law
341 South Main, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Connie Mower Esq.
43 East 400 South
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BEV,
I KNOW THAT WHEN I WALKED OUT OF THE SESSION WITH YOU AND STEVE ON
MARCH 4TH, IT WAS THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK. I'M
SORRY. I JUST PANICKED. I HAD COME INTO COUNSELING AND BACK INTO
THE RELATIONSHIP WITH A LOT OF HOPE AND WAS ALREADY VERY
EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED.
THE THOUGHT OF US BEING THAT CLOSE TO
FAILURE/EVOKED A VERY IMPULSIVE AND REGRETTABLE RESPONSE.
I'M ASKING YOU TO JOIN ME IN COUNSELING AGAIN WITH STEVE,
IT WILL HELP US.

I KNOW

I AM GOING TO WORK ON CHANGING PATTERNS IN MY PERSONAL BEHAVIOR
THAT HAVE BEEN SO DAMAGING TO OUR RELATIONSHIP.
_ .
(l

WILL TALK ABOUT PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE, NOT AVOID THEM.-^

^ ' l£ Lf*.

J

7 } I WILL DO THE THINGS I SAY I WILL DO AND I WILL DO THEM ON TIMEiH

^'1

/

I I WILL PAY MY BILLS ON TIME, INCLUDING MY TAXES.
v^ .
\I WILL REMAIN MONOGAMOUS AND WILL NOT DATE.
if &4-f - ^ ^ _
I WILL WORK WITH YOU ON A SATISFACTORY FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT
«
INCLUDING A JOIN ACCOUNT AND A COMPLETE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL THE
MONEY THAT I MAKE. I WOULD LIKE UNTIL AUGUST 31,1993 BEFORE WE
START THE JOINT ACCOUNT, SO THAT I CAN PAY OFF ALL OF MY BILLS.
I WOULD LIKE US TO NEGOTIATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR WORK AROUND THE
HOUSE AND CHILD CARE. WE SHOULD PROBABLY DO THAT IN SESSION WITH
STEVE.
IF YOU GO INTO COUNSELING WITH ME - STEVE SAYS IT WILL BE A THREE
STEP PROCESS.
1) BURYING PAST ANGER AND RESENTMENT.
2) RENEWING A COURTSHIP BETWEEN US.
3) DECIDING ON REMARRIAGE.

•i-**"^ ^ u V —9'//

lu^-u-triUc ~k< «../ u4i#
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339
Attorney at Law
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8920
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio),

;)
>
))

SECOND AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

)i

CaseNo.924903403DA

GARY THOMAS FACIO,

•]I

JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

)i

Commissioner Michael S. Evans

Petitioner,

Respondent.

This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 30 day
of May, 2000. Petitioner, BEVERLY ANN BURGE was present before the Court and was
represented by her counsel, Connie L. Mower. Respondent, GARY THOMAS FACIO was present
before the Court and was represented by his counsel, David Larsen. Both parties were sworn in and
testified, and various pieces of documentary evidence were admitted into evidence. The Court
having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the evidence in this matter
thereafter made the following Findings of Fact:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were each residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah

three (3) months before the filing of this Amended Complaint for Divorce.
2.

*~'

Petitioner and Respondent were wife and husband having been married on March *

16, 1974 in Wellington, Ohio.
3.

During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences developed between

the parties making continuation of the marriage impossible.
4.

Two (2) children were born as issue of the marriage, to wit: ASHLEY ALISON

BURGE FACIO, born March 31,1980, now twenty (20) years of age and PAUL MARLIN BURGE
FACIO, born April 20,1987, now thirteen (13) years of age. The children have resided continuously
with Petitioner throughout their minority and the youngest remains in her physical custody as of the
date of the trial. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded custody of the remaining minor
child, subject to Respondent's right of reasonable visitation.
5.

Prior to her marriage to Respondent, Petitioner obtained her Bachelor's Degree in

journalism in Ohio. Within several days of their marriage, Petitioner and Respondent moved to the
State of Utah, because Respondent had been accepted at the University of Utah to complete his
Bachelor's Degree.
6.

Both parties were substantially employed throughout the marriage. When

Petitionerfirstarrived in Utah, she took a variety oftemporary jobs to assist in supporting the family.
She was later employed by the University of Utah to write a medical history book. Then Petitioner
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accepted employment as a communications director for the United Way.

Following that

employment, Petitioner was employed in the communications department at Questar, formerly
known as Mountain Fuel. In 1982, Petitioner accepted employment at the U.S. Postal Service and
continues to work for the U.S. Postal Service today. Petitioner has worked in a variety of capacities
for the U.S. Postal Service but in the most recent years has been working in middle management.
At the time of the trial, Petitioner earned the sum of $5,000.00 per month from her employment with
the U.S. Postal Service.
7.

Following his move to Utah, Respondent had multiple careers and job

opportunities. He delivered blood on an emergency basis for the Red Cross. He was employed for
a period of time by Salt Lake County as a real estate appraiser. Respondent thereafter changed
careers and began working as a camera operator for Channel 2, KUTV. After a period of time,
Respondent switched employers and commenced working for Channel 5, KSL TV. Originally he
was employed as a camera operator, but ultimately worked his way up to the position of director.
In approximately 1982, Respondent quit his job at KSL TV and took employment at a TV station
in Phoenix as a director. After approximately one year, Respondent returned into the Salt Lake City
area and resumed working for KSL TV as a camera operator. Respondent then terminated his
employment with KSL and worked as afreelancecamera operator. Thereafter, Respondent sold real
estate and for a time, collected unemployment As his real estate career was unsuccessful, Respondent
accepted employment at Continental Airlines in 1996, working in the reservation department.
Respondent is presently employed by Continental Airlines and earns the sum of $3,500.00 per
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month.
8. Respondent completed his Bachelor's Degree at the University of Utah after approximately
sixteen (16) years study. Respondent further completed an independent film school and then
completed a course of study to qualify as a real estate agent.
9.

-^

Although both parties are currently employed on a full-time basis, Respondent is '

not working or earning at his highest potential. Respondent has had multiple career changes during
the course of his marriage, which were precipitated primarily by his dissatisfaction with his
employers and the jobs themselves. Respondent has multiple talents which could be used to improve
his employability: he is educated, he is intelligent, he is creative, he has particular skills in dealing
with people and he has multiple interests. Respondent, however, shows little follow through in his
plans and ideas and is now employed at a level less than his abilities would allow. Respondent is
underemployed.
10.

Petitioner retained an attorney on three separate occasions to obtain a divorce from

Respondent. Thefirsttime was in 1982, the second in 1991, and the third in 1997. In approximately
1981, the Petitioner and Respondent separated, and in 1982 the Respondent accepted employment
in Arizona. Prior to the parties' separation, Petitioner believed that Respondent was financially
irresponsible and creating unnecessary debt for the family. The Respondent had moved out of state,
and had little contact with the Petitioner or their infant daughter. The Petitionerfiledfor divorce in
1982. However, after Respondent began contacting the Petitioner, the Petitioner ultimately
dismissed that action. The parties reconciled, and in approximately 1983, the respondent moved
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back to the state of Utah and commenced residing with the Petitioner.
12. The parties separated again in 1991. Petitioner commenced the new divorce action
because she discovered that Respondent had surreptitiously cashed in various IRAs funded by
Petitioner andfromgifts from her family. Petitioner further discovered that Respondent had secretly
liquidated the college fund established by Petitioner for the parties' oldest child. Respondent had
secretly incurred numerous debts for his own personal use and not the family. Respondent had failed
and refused to file his federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner was concerned that
Respondent's spendthrift habits and inability to control his indebtedness would result in financial
ruin for herself and the children. Petitioner was further concerned about the Respondent's failure
to file the federal and state income tax returns. Petitioner worried that the family's financial
condition could be jeopardized by unpaid taxes, penalties and interest.
13.

More importantly however, Petitioner was concerned with the dishonesty that

surrounded Respondent and all his financial dealings. Respondent lied about his spending and his
dissipation of assets.

He failed to come forward with the truth until directly confronted by

Petitioner. Although Respondent pledged to correct his behavior, he never did. Petitioner instructed
her counsel, Louise Knauer, to prepare a Complaint for Divorce. Petitioner's counsel, in fact,
prepared such a Complaint. A copy of the Complaint was delivered to Respondent. Respondent did
not want to be divorced. Respondent pleaded with Petitioner to seek some other solution to their
financial instabilities other than divorce. Respondent wanted the marriage to continue, and
ultimately, Petitioner was convinced by Respondent that she should seek an Order for Separate
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Maintenance. An Order of Separate Maintenance; Respondent told Petitioner, would separate the
parties' assets and debts and would protect her financially from his debts and obligations while
preserving the marriage between the parties. Petitioner instructed her counsel to amend the
complaint from divorce to separate maintenance. That action was filed on the 11th day of August,
1992. Respondent thereafter executed an Acceptance, Waiver and Consent in which he agreed that
the Court could enter an Order consistent with Petitioner's Complaint for Separate of Maintenance.
On or about August 28, 1992, an Order for Separate Maintenance was signed and entered by the
Court.
14.

Petitioner testified that prior to executing the Acceptance, Waiver and Consent,

Respondent acknowledged to her that he had consulted with his attorney Brian Barnard, who
suggested changes to the terms of the Complaint to bring the terms in compliance with recent
changes in the law. As further evidence of Respondent's consultation with Mr. Barnard on the
Divorce and then the Separate Maintenance action, Petitioner testified that Respondent told her that
Mr. Barnard could not give her advice on a separate legal matter due to the pending action between
the parties. On the stand, Respondent denied speaking to his attorney about the Order of Separate
Maintenance. However, documentary evidence established that Respondent consulted at this time
with Mr. Barnard about a divorce. Additionally, Respondent acknowledged that Brian Barnard had
represented him in certain proceedings in the 1980's and further that Mr. Barnard represented him
in this action commencing in 1998. The Court credited Petitioner's testimony and found it
persuasive. Even if he had not, Respondent was intelligent enough and informed enough to know
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that he could seek legal counsel prior to agreeing to the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
15.

In the Order of Separate Maintenance, the Court ordered among other things:
A.

Petitioner and Respondent were awarded the joint legal custody of the
parties' minor children. Petitioner was awarded sole physical custody,
subject to the Respondent's right of liberal and reasonable visitation.

B.

Respondent was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per
month until September 1992. From September 1992, through September of
1993, Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $500.00 per month as and
for child support. This included his contribution for day care. Petitioner and
Respondent were ordered to exchange income tax returns and income
documentation beginning in 1993 and to recalculate in 1993, child support
based upon the parties' incomes.

C.

Petitioner was ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the
benefit of the minor children. Petitioner was further ordered to pay all
routine medical expenses incurred for the children. However, each party was
ordered to pay one-half (Vi) of any payment of extraordinary medical and
dental expenses for the minor children.

D.

Beginning October 1,1993, Respondent was ordered to equally share in the
child care expenses incurred by Petitioner related to her employment on or
before the first day of each month.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Burge v. Facio, Case No. 924903403
Page 8

E.

The Court divided the debts between the parties, assigning to Petitioner an
equitable share of the marital debts and to Respondent, his separate personal
debts.

F.

": '

Petitioner was awarded all right, title and interest in the residence, located at
2869 Live Oak Circle, titled exclusively in her name because non-marital
assets and a loan from Petitioner's mother were used to acquire the home.

G.

Prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, the parties sold the
marital residence located at 318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties
divided the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence in a fair and
equitable manner and the Court approved the division.

H.

The Court divided the parties' motor vehicles and entered orders with respect
to any debts owing thereon.

L

Petitioner was awarded all stocks or other securities in her name. Respondent
was awarded the stock in his name.

J,

Petitioner was awarded all IRA's accounts and savings bonds in her name
and the IRA account which was held jointly between the parties.

K.
. L.
M.

Each party was awarded the retirement accounts in his or her own names.
Neither party was awarded alimony from the other.
Various other orders were entered in the Order for Separate Maintenance
which are not particularly significant to the actions therein.
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16.

At the time of the parties' separation in 1991, each of the parties had acquired marital

and personal assets. Such assets include the following:
A.

In 1976, the parties acquired a marital residence and real property located at
318 E Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The family lived in this residence until
approximately October, 1989, when Petitioner purchased the home on Live
Oak Circle from separate funds. The parties moved into the Live Oak home.
The parties attempted to lease the E Street home and were successful in doing
so for a period of time. However, because they were unable to find reliable
long-term tenants, the E Street home was vacant. When the parties separated
in 1991, Respondent moved from Petitioner's residence on Live Oak Circle
to the marital residence located on E Street. Even though Respondent was
employed and had earnings with which to meet his own expenses after
separation, Respondent failed to make the mortgage payments on the E Street
residence where he was residing. In order to protect her credit, Petitioner was
forced not only to pay the mortgage on her residence on Live Oak Circle, but
likewise was forced to pay the mortgage obligation on the E Street residence
during Respondent's tenancy. After many months of paying both mortgage
obligations, Petitioner insisted that the E Street home be sold. Respondent
ultimately agreed. Petitioner executed a Quit Claim Deed to the residence to
Respondent and Respondent thereafter sold that property. From the sale of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Burge v. Facio, Case No. 924903403
Page 10

the E Street home, Respondent, who acted as his own real estate agent,
received gross proceeds in the amount of $48,000.00. Petitioner and
Respondent agreed that Respondent could retain all proceeds from the sale,
however Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner back for all the assets depleted
by him without her knowledge or consent while they were living together.
To satisfy this obligation, Respondent paid Petitioner the sum of $25,000.00.
Respondent kept the remaining proceeds. He spent the proceeds on a lap top,
car phone, clothing for himself, used some for living expenses and paid for
business expenses including a school for cash flow management in San
Diego, California for commercial real estate. The parties further agreed that
because the Live Oak Circle was titled exclusively in Petitioner's name and
because Petitioner had acquired this home using separate funds in the form
of gifts from her mother and a loan from her mother, that it was fair and
reasonable that Petitioner be awarded all right, title and interest in Live Oak
Circle.
B.

During the course of the marriage, the parties each acquired retirement
benefits through employment. Petitioner had acquired employment benefits
through the U. S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired retirement benefits
through his employment at KSL TV. The parties agreed that each would be
awarded her or his own retirement benefits, subject to no claim in the other.
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C.

Routinely during the course of the marriage, Petitioner received various gifts
and advances on her inheritance from her mother. She also received an
inheritance from her uncle in 1993 or 1994. When she received such gifts
and monies, Petitioner placed these funds into separate accounts titled in her
name alone (in the form of savings accounts, CD's, IRA's, mutual funds,
stocks and bonds.) These funds were never co-mingled with Respondent's
property after the separation in 1991. The parties thereafter agreed that it was
fair and reasonable that Petitioner retain as her separate property those
accounts acquired primarily from these gifts and/or advances on her
inheritance subject to no claim in Respondent

D.

Early in the marriage, Respondent assisted in meeting the family's financial
needs and obligations. After 1989, Petitioner alone was forced to assume
and discharge all of the marital indebtedness that had jointly acquired by the
parties for the benefit of the family. Respondent paid none of these debts.
At the time of the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, most of the
joint marital indebtedness had been discharged by Petitioner. Petitioner was
therefore only ordered to pay and hold Respondent harmless on the loan from
her mother used as a partial down payment on the Live Oak home.
Respondent had acquired various non marital debts, including obligations on
two credit cards. These debts were not for a family purpose and were
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exclusively incurred by Respondent for his own benefit. Respondent agreed
to pay and hold Petitioner harmless from those debts.
17.

From 1991, until approximately end of 1993 or early 1994, the parties continued

to live separate and apart. Respondent repeatedly represented to Petitioner that he was working very
diligently to resolve his financial insolvency. Respondent repeatedly agreed or represented to
Petitioner that he hadfiledor was preparing tofilethe state and federal returns for all years in which •'•"'•"
he had not. Respondent further continued to promise Petitioner that they would be able to reconcile
at some point in the future because of the improvements that he had made in his life. Petitioner and
Respondent again commenced with marital counseling trying resolve their differences. Respondent
also sought individual counseling. On or about March 31,1993, Respondent wrote Petitioner a letter
in which he again represented that he was "going to work on changing patterns in my personal
behavior that has been so damaging to our relationship". Respondent promised Petitioner that he
would talk about problems between the parties and to not avoid them. He promised that he would
do the things that he said he would do and do them in a timely fashion. He promised to pay his bills
on time, including his taxes. He promised, further, to remain monogamous. In this letter,
Respondent invited Petitioner to resume joint counseling to repair the relationship. Respondent
proposed that the parties' potential reconciliation be a three step process. "1) burying past anger and
resentment 2) renewing a courtship between us and 3) deciding on a remarriage." In response to
Respondent's letter, Petitioner agreed to consider actual reconciliation if Respondent in fact followed
through on his commitment he detailed in the letter. The end of 1993 or early 1994, Petitioner
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learned that Respondent had lost his housing. Petitioner was concerned that Respondent would not
be able to find suitable replacement housing. Petitioner agreed to allow Respondent to move back
into her residence so that he could continue to work on the problems that led to the parties' initial
separation. Petitioner hoped, for the sake of her children, Respondent would be able to meet all the
commitments set forth in his letter of March 31, 1993. Both parties understood that just because
Petitioner allowed Respondent to move into her residence, that such did not mean the parties had
reconciled. According to the parties agreement, actual reconciliation would be accomplished by a
remarriage. With that understanding, Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence.
18.

While Respondent lived with Petitioner, he continued to work in his various

occupations. Respondent was not a house husband. There was not a gender role reversal between
the parties wherein Petitioner was the bread winner and Respondent was responsible for the home
and children. Petitioner continued to be primarily responsible to attend to the children and all of
their needs. Petitioner cleaned the house, did the yard work, did the laundry, grocery shopping and
otherwise managed the household. Respondent did do small services for Petitioner. He painted a
wall in the basement. He clipped and shredded refuse from the lawn on one occasion. He planted
acorns to raise scrub oak trees. Respondent did do some chores around the house. Respondent did
attend to some of the children's needs when he was not working. However, Petitioner could not trust
Respondent to follow through with serious responsibilities and therefore did those herself. For
example, Respondent wanted to be responsible to take the parties son Paul to school. In 24 days,
Paul had 12 tardies. Petitioner resumed delivering the child to school herself.
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19.

In spite of the fact that Petitioner and Respondent resided under the same roof, the

parties still lived under the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance; in that the parties' financial
matters continued to be held separate from the other. Following the parties' separation in 1991,
Petitioner had closed the parties' joint account and established her own separate checking account.
Petitioner maintained the investments awarded to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance in
separate accounts. All of the household obligations were in Petitioner's name; Respondent assumed *
no liability for these. Petitioner and the children lived a modest lifestyle. However, Petitioner set
aside further savings for the children's college and for her retirement in separate accounts. Petitioner
continued to pay for her home. The Petitionerfiledseparate tax returns yearly as head of household,
with the Respondent's knowledge. When Respondent moved into the residence, there was no
formal agreement as to how much he would contribute to the household to offset the additional
expenses for his residence in that home. Instead, Petitioner and Respondent agreed that he would
pay $500.00 per month for child support as though the parties were living separately. Petitioner paid
all of her liabilities for herself and the children and paid all bills with connection with the household
20.

Petitioner would not have allowed Respondent to live in her home without the

protection ofthe Order of Separate Maintenance insulating her income and assetsfromRespondent's
irresponsible financial behavior. Petitioner testified that on at least on a half dozen occasions, the
parties specifically discussed the fact that the Order of Separate Maintenance was still in place,
completely separating the parties assets and liabilities. Respondent told Petitioner, "The Order of
Separate Maintenance is there for your and the children's protection". "I want you to feel
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comfortable about money issues". Respondent never asked the Court to set aside the order because
he knew his financial problems were not resolved and the Petitioner never asked that the order be
lifted. Both parties relied on and implemented the provisions of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
For example, on one occasion, Petitioner attempted to obtain a home equity loan. When the
mortgage company obtained a credit report on Petitioner, a bill owing to Sears incurred separately
by Respondent appeared on her report. Respondent asked Sears to delete the credit report on this
account, because he and Petitioner were living under an "Order of Separate Maintenance" and
therefore, Petitioner could not be held liable for his debts. Because of the Order of Separate
Maintenance, Sears deleted the negative credit report on Petitioner's credit for the obligation owing
to them. Petitioner was then able to obtain a home equity loan in her own name.
21. Even though Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $500.00 per month child support while
he resided in her home from 1994 through September of 1997, Respondent only contributed
$5,600.00 to the children's support during that time period. Respondent made no other financial
contribution to the household. In fact, documentary evidence was admitted which substantiated the
fact that Respondent himself did not believe he had an ongoing financial obligation to Petitioner's
household and the children. In his Consumer Credit Counseling application, he did not list the
Petitioner as his spouse. He did not list any family bills, any payments toward a rent or mortgage
or even information regarding his obligation to his children.
22. Even though he had promised Petitioner that he would become financially solvent after
he moved in with her, Respondent continued to incur unnecessary indebtedness. Respondent failed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Burge v. Facio, Case No. 924903403
Page 16

to pay his personal monthly obligations on a timely basis and debt collection summonses and
subpoenas were delivered to the Respondent at the Live Oak address. Respondent's financial
condition was so poor that he sought the assistance of Consumer Credit Counseling to help him meet
his monthly obligations to his own personal creditors. Before his debts were paid off, Respondent
terminated his relationship with Consumer Credit Counseling. Respondent continued to avoid filing
of his tax returns. Respondent lead Petitioner to believe he had appointments with his accountant,
that he was gathering the financial information, that the returns were going to be filed. To the best
of Petitioner's information, Respondent had not filed taxes from 1990 to the present. Respondent
borrowed money from Petitioner for his own needs. Each time, he promised he would pay her back.
Respondent never did. Respondent acknowledged under oath that he never met the conditions
agreed to for permanent reconciliation. In fact Respondent testified that doing so was still a "work
in progress". Respondent liquidated his KSL retirement in 1993/1994 and dissipated the proceeds.
Respondent acquired nothing from his income in terms of assets or cash to show from his
employment. Respondent was not monogamous. He continued to date and have girlfriends while
he lived with the Petitioner.
23.

Because of his failure to correct his behavior, Petitioner asked Respondent to

move out. Respondent told Petitioner he did not have any money to move out. Petitioner loaned
Respondent $1,800.00 to assist him in securing an apartment and another $3,000.00 to purchase a
car for transportation. Petitioner believed that this was the last time she would have to pay
Respondent money. Based upon Respondent's history of financial failure and irresponsibility,
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Petitioner did not expect repayment of the loan.
24.

Petitioner filed again for divorce on October 7, 1997. Various orders were

entered on a temporary basis.
25. On or about March 19,1999, this Court entered its Bifurcated Decree of Divorce granting
Petitioner a divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The financial issues raised in
this matter were bifurcated for further hearing before the Court.
26. Trial was held on May 30, 2000. The Court issued its ruling in open Court. Further
proceedings were held on August 4, 2000, to clarify the Courts ruling. At the time of trial,
Respondent did not dispute custody, child support, medical insurance, debt division, attorney's fees,
distribution of Petitioner's IRA's, stocks, bonds or other investments outlined in her financial
declaration. Respondent only contested the equity acquired in Petitioner's residence and division
of Petitioner's retirement accounts with the US Postal Service.
27. After trial, the Court made the following orders:
A. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded the sole care, custody and
control of the remaining minor child subject to Respondent's right of reasonable
visitation as the parties may agree but at a minimum, consistent with Utah Code
Annotated §30-3-35.
B. Effective June 1, 2000, Respondent was ordered to pay to Petitioner child
support in the sum of $270.84 per month which is consistent with the Utah Child
Support Guidelines, using gross income from Petitioner of $5,000.00 and gross
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income of Respondent of $2978.00. Respondent's child support obligation is
payable one-half on the 5th and the remaining one-half on the 20th of each calendar
month. Respondent's obligation should be ordered to continue until the minor child
reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last.

^"

C. Petitioner should be ordered to maintain medical and dental insurance for the
benefit of the child. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-half of the child's per
capita share of the entire premium. Respondent should be ordered to pay one-half
of the non-covered medical bills incurred by the Petitioner for the child. Petitioner
should be ordered to provide proof at the end of each calendar month that she
incurred a non-covered cost by providing a copy of her insurance explanation of
benefits form. Respondent should be ordered to pay his one-half share within 30
days of receipt.
D. Due to the age of the remaining child, no further daycare will be incurred.
E. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner incurred various
debts and obligations which are detailed on her Financial Declaration which isfiledwith this Court.
Because these debts were incurred by Petitioner after the entry ofthe Order of Separate Maintenance,
they are separate debts. Petitioner should assume and discharge these debts and hold Respondent
harmless therefrom.
F. After the entry ofthe Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent incurred various
debts and obligations detailed on his Financial Declaration which is onfilewith this Court. Because
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Respondent incurred this indebtedness after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, these
debts are separate. Respondent shall assume and discharge these debts and hold the Petitioner
harmless therefrom.
28. Petitioner has acquired an interest in various IRA's, Stocks, bonds, and other investments.
Petitioner shall be awarded all right, title and interest in the American Century IRA, the SmithBarney IRA, the Key Bank IRA, the Charles Schwab IRA, the Co Bank Investment, Mass Investors
Gross Stock Fund A, AL Tel, RPM, Alliance Inc. Fund, National Auto Credit Inc., Transonic
Company, Traveler's, CSX, American General Corp, Vanguard 500 Index Fund, American Century
Ultra, Questar and Novell. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in these investments
because they were principally gifted to her or acquired prior to entry of the Order of Separate
Maintenance and because any contribution made thereafter, was made from Petitioner's separate
funds.
29. Petitioner is awarded all right, title and interest in the residence located at 2963 Live Oak
Circle. Petitioner shall discharge the indebtedness on this residence and shall hold Respondent
harmless therefrom. The Court awards this property to Petitioner because it awarded this property
to her in the Order of Separate Maintenance entered in 1992 and because any contribution to the
equity since that time has been made from Petitioner's separate funds.
30. Petitioner has continued to acquire an interest in various pension and retirement through
her employment through the U.S. Postal Service. Petitioner was previously awarded those benefits
which were accumulated prior to the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance in 1992. Petitioner
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is further awarded all right, title and interest in these accounts, which were accumulated after the
entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Petitioner is awarded this as her separate property
because she obtained these additional benefits through her separate funds.

^

31. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Respondent acquired an interest
in certain pension and retirement benefits through his employment at Continental Airlines.
Respondent is awarded this property as his sole and separate property, having been acquired from
his separate funds.
32. After the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner acquired an interest in
a savings and a checking account. Because those accounts were funded with separate funds from
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance, Petitioner is awarded all right, title
and interest in those accounts.
33. Petitioner sought judgment against Respondent for all unpaid child support due to her
after Respondent moved into Petitioner's residence. The Court denies that Petitioner's request for
judgment, finding that although Respondent only paid $5,600.00 of what would have exceeded
$35,000.00 in child support obligation, the Court will not grant child support if the parties were
residing under the same roof. However, Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner all unpaid child
support from 1992 until he moved into Petitioner's house. Therefore, judgment of $11,500.00
should enter against Respondent.
34. Petitioner and Respondent were each ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its Conclusions of Law:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter herein.
2. Petitioner shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony
between Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to
become final upon signing and entry.
3. Respondent did not contest the orders set forth in paragraphs 4-13 below, therefore, the
Court concludes that such orders are fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
4. Petitioner shall be awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child
to wit: PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, born April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded
reasonable rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of
Visitation contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines
to Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37.
5. Effective June 1, 2000, the parties' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $310.00 per month, which sum is
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support
obligations should be payable one-half (Vi) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half
(Vi) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever
occurs later.
6. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred
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Therefore, no ongoing order needs to be entered.
7. Respondent's obligation to pay child support should be paid through Automatic Wage
Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. seg. Any administrative fee
imposed to process Automatic Wage Withholding shall be collected from Respondent in addition '*
to his base child support obligations.

^%

8. Effective June 1, 2000, Petitioner shall continue to be ordered to maintain a policy of
medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through
her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent
should each be ordered to pay one-half (14) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and
dental insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half QA) share is $16.45. Petitioner and
Respondent shall each be ordered to assume and pay one-half (lA) of all non-covered medical and
dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner shall be ordered to
provide written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical
and dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent should be ordered to pay
his one-half QA) share of the non-medical and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of
such documentation.
9. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance
policy on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor
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child as the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent should each
be enjoined and restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value
of such life insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates
from high school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and
beneficiary status on or about January 15th of each calendar year.
10. Petitioner shall be awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for
purposes of filing of federal and state income tax returns.
11. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a full time basis.
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent should be awarded
alimony either now or in the future.
12. Each party should be awarded those items of personal property now in his or her
possession. Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal
property if he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing.
13. Each party should be awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name.
14. The Respondent contested at trial the legal effect of the Order of Separate Maintenance
entered on or about August 28, 1992.
15. In 1992 , Respondent was given a copy of the complaint for Separate Maintenance.
Respondent did not contest the relief requested. Respondent voluntarily executed an Acceptance,
Waiver and Consent, which gave the Court the authority to enter its orders consistent with the
Complaint.
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16. Respondent consulted with his attorney, Brian Barnard, regarding the proposed terms
of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Respondent's execution of the Appearance, Waiver and
Consent was knowing.

*^

17. The Order of Separate Maintenance was the product of arms length negotiations between *
the parties.

'•*''

18. Respondent is an intelligent, well-educated man, who is able to read and understand the
English language and could understand the terms of the Complaint for Separate Maintenance.
19. No duress, coercion or trickery was employed to induce the Respondent to agree to the
terms of the Separate Maintenance.
20. The Order of Separate Maintenance, which distributed the parties' assets and allocated
debts, among other things, appears to be a fair, equitable and permanent settlement of the parties'
respective rights and obligations as they existed in 1991 and therefore, the order is res judicata as to
the property settlement and other issues addressed in the order because it was a valid order. The
Court will not redistribute property awarded under that order. Each of the parties received an
equitable portion of the equity in the marital residence jointly acquired through the marriage. The
proceedsfromthe home on E Street were av/arded to Respondent, provided that he paid to Petitioner
the sum of $25,000.00 to restore certain funds which the Respondent had dissipated during the
marriage. Respondent therefore received all of the equity in that residence. He cannot claim the
order was unfair to him. He later spent these funds on personal items and not family expenses.
Petitioner was awarded as her separate property the home located on Live Oak Circle. This home
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was primarily acquired with separate funds, those being gifts and loans from Petitioner's family.
Respondent made little or no contribution to this home and therefore, cannot claim the order was
unfair to him. The Court entered its Order awarding each of the parties those retirement and pension
benefits that she and he had individually acquired throughout the marriage. Petitioner had acquired
benefits through her employment with the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent had acquired benefits
through his employment and KSL TV. The division of retirement was not unfair to Respondent. The
Court further awarded each party his or her separate property, received through gift or inheritance,
which was un-commingled with the marital estate.
21. The Order of Separate Maintenance further divided the existing debts between the parties
in a fair and equitable manner. Petitioner was ordered to pay certain outstanding debts of the
marriage. Respondent was ordered to pay only his personal liabilities. The order is not unfair to
Respondent.
22. All remaining orders in the Order of Separate Maintenance appear to be fair and
reasonable and consistent with the law.
23. Once the Order for Separate Maintenance was entered, the partiesfinancialaffairs were
completely separated. Even though, Petitioner in 1993 or 1994, allowed Respondent to live under
her roof, the parties did not intend to dissolve the protections given under the Order of Separate
Maintenance. Both parties relied upon its provisions in conducting theirfinancialaffairs. The Court
was never asked by either party to change the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance. Neither
party petitioned the Court to terminate the obligations under the Order of Separate Maintenance.
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Upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation, the Court could have modified
or terminated the existing Order. However, under the evidence of this case, the Court finds, that the
"reconciliation" was not permanent not complete as required. It was tentative, provisional and
conditional based upon Respondent's promised performance to certain agreed conditions. Because
Respondent did not meet the stated conditions, no voluntary or permanent reconciliation took place..._
24. From 1992 through 1997, the parties' had separate finances. The parties maintained no
joint accounts. The parties did not maintain co-ownership of property or maintained joint
obligations. Respondent did not acquire a further marital interest in Petitioner's property
25. From 1992 to 1997, Petitioner met all of the needs of the household, including the minor
children, from her separate income. Except that Respondent paid $5,600.00 as and for child support
during that period of time. Petitioner retained these funds but the Court will not grant Petitioner
further judgment for unpaid support during the time Respondent lived in the same house as the
children. Judgment should enter against Respondent for unpaid support from May 1991 to
December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves ruling on any other arrearage.
26. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the
Petitioner in the Order of Separate Maintenance.
27. Respondent should not be awarded any further interest in retirement funds acquired by
Petitioner after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
28. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle should be denied.
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29. Petitioner and Respondent should each be ordered to assume and pay his or her own
attorney's fees and costs.
30. Each party should be ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the
Amended Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.

HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

NOTICE
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10)
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.

CONNIE L. MOWER
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

day of

, 2001,1 mailed,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS O F FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following:

David Larsen
341 S Main Ste 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CONNIE L. MOWER, #2339
Attorney at Law
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-8920
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

]I
)
]

SECOND AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.

]>

CaseNo.924903403DA

GARY THOMAS FACIO,

])

JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

]i

Commissioner Michael S. Evans

BEVERLY ANN BURGE (fka Facio),
Petitioner,

Respondent.

This matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable William B. Bohling, on the 30 day
of May, 2000. The Court having heard the testimony of the parties and having considered all the
evidence in this matter and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for good
cause appearing, now therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between
Petitioner and Respondent upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final
upon signing and entry.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second Amended Decree of Divorce
Burge v. Facio Case No. 924903403
Page 2

2. Petitioner is awarded sole physical custody of the parties' remaining minor child to wit:
PAUL MARLIN BURGE FACIO, born April 20, 1987. Respondent shall be awarded reasonable
rights of visitation with this child as such are set forth with Minimal Schedule of Visitation
contained in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-35 and further subject to the Advisory Guidelines to™
Visitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-33, 34, 36 & 37.

^

3. Effective June 1, 2000, the parties' minor child is in need of support. Respondent is*
hereby ordered to pay ongoing child support in the sum of $310.00 per month, which sum is
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Guidelines. Respondent's child support
obligations should be payable one-half (14) on the fifth day of each month and remaining one-half
(Vi) on or before the twentieth of each month. Respondent's child support obligations shall continue
until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school whichever
occurs later.
4. Due to the age of the remaining minor child, no day care expenses are incurred Therefore,
no ongoing order is entered.
5. Respondent's obligation to pay child support is ordered to be paid through Automatic
Wage Withholding as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11-501 et. seg. Any administrative
fee imposed to process Automatic Wage; Withholding are to be collected from Respondent in
addition to his base child support obligations.
6. Effective June 1,2000, Petitioner is ordered to continue to be ordered to maintain a policy
of medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as such is available to her through
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her employment at reasonable cost. As a further award of child support, Petitioner and Respondent
are each ordered to pay one-half (!4) of the child's portion of the Petitioner's medical and dental
insurance premiums. At present, Respondent's one-half (14) share is $16.45. Petitioner and
Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay one-half (14) of all non-covered medical and dental
expenses incurred for the minor child, including co-payments and deductibles and the cost of
orthodontia, vision care and psychological services if necessary. After Petitioner has processed the
child's medical and dental bills through her insurance company, Petitioner is ordered to provide
written documentation to the Respondent, verifying the amount of the non-covered medical and
dental expenses incurred for the minor child each month. Respondent is ordered to pay his one-half
(!4) share of the non-medical and dental expenses within thirty (30) days of receipt of such
documentation.
7. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to secure and maintain a life insurance policy
on her and his own life and in a face amount of not less than $50,000.00, naming the minor child as
the exclusive and irrevocable beneficiary thereon. Petitioner and Respondent are each enjoined and
restrained from pledging, borrowing, transferring or any way encumbering the value of such life
insurance policies until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high
school whichever occurs later. The parties shall verify the existence of life insurance and beneficiary
status on or about January 15th of each calendar year.
8. Petitioner is awarded the dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for purposes
of filing of federal and state income tax returns.
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9. Petitioner and Respondent are both able-bodied and employed on a full time basis.
Respondent is voluntarily underemployed. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent are awarded alimony
either now or in the future.
10. Each party is awarded those items of personal property now in his or her possession.
Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent could have certain items of personal property if
he took possession of these items within three (3) months of the court hearing.

*

11. Each party is awarded those motor vehicles titled in his or her name.
12. The Court will not grant Petitioner further judgment for unpaid support during the time
Respondent lived in the same house as the children. Judgment will enter against Respondent for
unpaid support from May 1991 to December 1993 in the sum of $11,500.00. The Court reserves
ruling on any other arrearage.
13. Respondent is not awarded any further interest in the residence awarded to the Petitioner
in the Order of Separate Maintenance.
14. Respondent is not awarded anyfiirtherinterest in retirement funds acquired by Petitioner
after the entry of the Order of Separate Maintenance.
15. Petitioner's request for judgment in excess of $30,000.00 for unpaid child support while
Respondent lived at Live Oak Circle is denied.
16. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay his or her own attorney's
fees and costs.
17. Each party is ordered to execute any document necessary to effect the terms of the
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Amended Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

NOTICE
The foregoing Order has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule
4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allowsfive(5) days following hand delivery, or ten (10)
days if service by mail, for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such objection, as
to form, is not received within the subscribed time period, the Order will be executed by the Court.
DATED this

day of

,2001.

CONNIE L. MOWER
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the

day of

, 2001,1 caused

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Second Amended Decree of Divorce to be mailed to the
following:
David Larsen
341 S Main Ste 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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